Newsclip

**Gemma Ware:** Camp David, July 2000. US President Bill Clinton, now approaching the end of his second and final term in office, is taking a walk in the woods.

Alongside him are Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Ehud Barak, prime minister of Israel. It's been seven years since the hopeful handshake between Arafat and Barak's predecessor, Yitzhak Rabin, on the White House lawn, that marked the start of the Oslo peace process.

But years of negotiation and diplomacy have yet to result in a permanent peace agreement in the Middle East. At Camp David, the key final status issues are still on the table, including the status of Jerusalem, the borders of a future Palestinian state, the issue of Palestinian refugees, and Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank and Gaza.

Ultimately, no agreement was reached that summer in Camp David, and the failure was followed a few months later by the start of a Palestinian uprising, the second intifada, that would continue on for years.

I'm Gemma Ware from The Conversation, and you're listening to part two of Inside the Oslo Accords, a special series from The Conversation Weekly. I'm joined for this series by James Rodgers, a reader in international journalism and Amnon Aran, professor of international politics, both at City University of London in the UK. Welcome back both of you.

**James Rodgers:** Hello Gemma.

**Amnon Aran:** Hello Gemma.

**Gemma Ware:** So in our first episode, we heard from the former Norwegian politician Jan Egeland about his role in the secret negotiations that led up to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.

And now in this second episode, we're going to find out more about what happened after Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin shook hands on the White House lawn. We've
got two guests to help us do that. Two former politicians involved in the peace process. One Palestinian, Hanan Ashrawi, and one Israeli, Yossi Beilin.

James, we're going to hear from Dr. Ashrawi first. So, can you tell us a bit about her, please?

**James Rodgers:** Well, Gemma, for decades, Hanan Ashrawi has been a campaigner for Palestinian rights and an articulate advocate for the Palestinian cause, both in diplomatic processes and the international media. She's a political and civil society leader, very much a woman in a man's world, especially 30 years ago, and was the official spokesperson of the Palestinian delegation to the Middle East peace process in the 1990s.

So, she really has an insight into the way things have developed over this 30 year period that we're making the focus of our series. And, as we'll hear in this episode, perhaps not surprisingly given the fact the Oslo Accords did not lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state, she takes at times a rather skeptical view of the process, but also offers a real insider's view of how recent history has unfolded.

**Gemma Ware:** And Hanan Ashrawi was involved, as you say, in a different set of Middle East peace negotiations at the time, those taking place in Madrid. Amnon, can you tell us a bit about those talks and their importance?

**Amnon Aran:** Yes, the Madrid conference convened between the 30th of October and the 2nd of November, 1991. It was the starting point for subsequent rounds of negotiations between Israel and the Arab states.

The force behind the conference was the then U. S. Secretary of State, James Baker, who managed to bring Israel to negotiate for the first time with Arab states who did not have relations with Israel apart from Egypt, of course, who signed an agreement with Israel already in 1979.

The Palestinians participated in the conference as part of a joint delegation with Jordan, actually, because the Israeli government, then led by Yitzhak Shamir, rejected any prospect that the Palestinians would attend the Madrid conference independently.

And this created a very complex situation where the Palestinian Liberation Organization's leadership was not officially present at the Madrid conference and was only able to give instructions to Palestinian delegates behind the scenes from where they were sitting in Tunis using a fax machine.

And it would only be later that the PLO leadership would enter negotiations with Israel via the secret Oslo channel without informing their own delegation at Madrid,
that at the same time was still involved in its own set of negotiations; although the secret channel in Oslo had already commenced.

**James Rodgers:** So with all that in mind, I started by asking Hanan Ashrawi what the Oslo Accords were designed to achieve.

**Hanan Ashrawi:** I think people had different intentions and different expectations and objectives. So the Oslo Accords, or if you want to talk about the Oslo process, because the initial agreement is the Declaration of Principles. So, that was negotiated in Oslo and then signed on the White House lawn. But basically the process meant different things to different people.

To the Palestinians, they thought that this was the beginning of ending the occupation, getting Palestinian rights, leading to a statehood and sovereignty, and the exercise of self determination. That was very clear, including, of course, the right of return, because they expected the leadership to return, and therefore to begin that whole process.

To the Israelis, it was a basis for reorganizing the occupation, for handing over administrative, functional, technical duties to a Palestinian leadership, and to maintaining their control and their sovereignty over the land and the resources and even the people as they see fit, and to interest the occupation in a different way with the approval of the Palestinian leadership who were assigned specific tasks.

To the Americans, it was, I think it was the implementation of what they signed on to in the Camp David Accords with the Egyptians. And I discussed this with Jimmy Carter because they discussed autonomy for the Palestinians, they didn't discuss sovereignty. And so the American team was committed to autonomy, which is essentially functional rather than territorial or sovereign. And they didn't want to deviate from that, but the Americans were certainly taking their cue, and in many cases, their instructions from the Israelis.

So each one had a different expectation. And of course, the Americans had promised the Arabs to join the whole Gulf War and so on that they would find a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict so to speak, and therefore they wanted to, as they said, fulfill that promise but without in any way disturbing the strategic alliance between the US and Israel.

**James Rodgers:** So, is it fair to say that on the Palestinian side, there was a degree of skepticism from the outset, you seem to be suggesting that as far as you could see, this was about re-entrenching the occupation in a way, more effectively?

**Hanan Ashrawi:** Look, not all, the Palestinians were not all on one side. There were many people who were engaged in the negotiations, what we call the Madrid Washington process, who were very skeptical. But the people who negotiated the Oslo
Agreement, the Declaration of Principles, in secret, in the dark, were two people from the PLO, from Tunis, from exile. So they were not prepared. They saw in this a way out, and the signing of the agreement meant they're going home, beginning the process of statehood.

So they weren't as skeptical because they didn't see it as such. We did. I saw it before the signing on the White House lawn, and I was very upset, and I said, can we renegotiate this, can we do something about it? This has all the elements of what not to do when you're negotiating, particularly in this power asymmetry, when occupier and occupied are negotiating and you make everything subject to the approval of the powerful party of the occupier. So, this is not how to negotiate, and you need terms of reference, you need international law, you need to have arbitration, you need to have oversight.

Anyway, I don't know, they were willfully optimistic, or they expected that there would be something that would begin a process of unravelling the current situation, which was in many ways detrimental to also the leadership because, as you know, the PLO was in very bad shape. And I think the Israelis knew that. They exploited the fact that the PLO was at its weakest, and was going bankrupt, and didn't have, and was away from the region in the sense that it was exiled to Tunis.

And actually one of the objectives was ending the leadership role of the PLO, because the PLO was the sole legitimate representative. It was seen as representing Palestinians everywhere, as Yasser Arafat used to say, we are the right to self determination. And so they were trying desperately. There was a Western agreement, not just the Americans, but the Europeans, to end the role of the PLO and therefore, to deal with us as people under occupation, again, was functional administrative responsibilities rather than with sovereign rights.

So we went with a clear incorporation of the power asymmetry, with clear ways in which the Palestinians were not treated equally, and with attempts at pandering to the Israelis to make them come to the negotiations. And all these things happened in a way, in a context which wasn't very positive; in many ways which was hostile to Palestinians.

**Amnon Aran:** I was wondering maybe if you could share with us your feelings or your recollections about how the Oslo accords and subsequently the Oslo process was really received within the occupied Palestinian territories more broadly.

**Hanan Ashrawi:** When we went to Madrid, it was a different process. We went with a delegation from the occupied territories. We set up a leadership committee. We set up strategic committees. We set up technical committees. We had legal advice and specialists and experts on settlements, on land, on international law. We didn't have full support, yes. But when we came back, we had 87% support because they saw that we didn't go to surrender; that we presented the Palestinian case in all honesty and we
represented the people with their integrity and their history and not just their suffering, but we also defended our rights and we had a clear vision of what we wanted.

When they negotiated in secret in Oslo, they totally disregarded all these things that we were talking about. They postponed all the key issues without any assurances or guarantees, the accepted this power asymmetry accepted. Accepted as I said, the functional approach, separation of people from the land. They accepted even oral promises, as I heard, and they accepted the phased approach, and there were all sorts of other things involved.

Gradually, at first, the Palestinians hadn't, in many ways, textually analyzed the agreement. They saw this as an agreement that was presented to the Palestinian public as the beginning of the process of ending the occupation and getting our freedom and rights. Gradually, as reality unfolded, and they saw how these agreements were so clearly biased, that Israel's hands were not tied, that Israel used and abused those agreements in order to continue settlement activities, continue the siege and fragmentation, both of Gaza and the West Bank; continue the killing spree even, continue its military control and oppression of the Palestinian people. And to escalate, they annexed Jerusalem, everything that was permanent status they decided was their own to decide on singularly and separately and unilaterally the way they did on settlements, on Jerusalem, on water, on all these, on security. These are all permanent status issues that were postponed without arbitration and guarantees.

So they use them as though they are at their disposal, as though anything that is postponed is (unclear). So Palestinians gradually became more and more aware of all the pitfalls and of all the flaws and of all the dangers inherent in such an agreement. And when they saw that Israel continued with its total impunity, there was no intervention whatsoever to focus into account or to bring it to compliance with the signed agreements. So, the Palestinian people began to lose faith, not just in the agreement and in the process, but gradually even in their own leadership, which strengthened, of course, the opposition, strengthened Hamas, because the PLO agenda was beginning to be seen as a failed agenda, and Hamas advocating armed struggle and so on began to gain support.

James Rodgers: What do you think the biggest obstacles to success were? Because from what you're saying, Dr. Ashrawi, it sounds like you think the way that the whole process was designed, meant it was destined to fail in the end…

Hanan Ashrawi: It was destined to bring the Palestinians to their knees and to give the Israelis maximum advantage. The immunity from any kind of accountability, their ability to use power and control to expand their land theft and resources and so on. It wasn't designed to fail, it had several objectives, but it failed primarily because it did not take into account Palestinian rights and because the Palestinian people would not and did not surrender.
The most important thing, of course, is the continuation and expansion of settlement activities because how can you talk about a Palestinian state or two-state solution and ending the occupation while Israel is expanding and annexing and so on. And of course, it became very clear that there was no political will or intention or even backbone among the Western governments to hold Israel to account or to engage or to intervene or to even use any kind of sanctions or accountability for Israel. So it was emboldened. So rather than the devolution of occupation and evolution of statehood; we ended up with devolution of statehood and evolution of occupation.

And the system of control that emerged was just so incredibly cruel and pervasive that, as I said, weakened the belief in the PLO and its agenda, which led also to the lack of electoral result. The refusal to have any kind of internal accountability or oversight. And Israel presented them with a clear system of impunity and lawlessness and criminality. So why should they set up a system that was accountable and transparent and democratic, when they were living under such conditions that they were entirely undemocratic and unaccountable? It created a really distorted, dysfunctional system, whether in Palestine or in the Palestinian-Israeli relationship, or even the world's responsibility for their own so-called global rule of law or rules based system that was never implemented when it came to Palestine.

**Amnon Aran:** You describe a very complex and challenging reality, and I was wondering, in that context, could you maybe share with us your assessment of the leadership shown by President Yasser Arafat during the process?

**Hanan Ashrawi:** Yasser Arafat was able to read regional and even global realities, in addition to domestic realities. He never allowed any internal rifts to come out. He always maintained to control everybody, and govern them, so he had, and he had standing. He was seen as the historical, national, larger than life leader. And he knew how to maneuver within the region. Although, he made the mistakes with the issue of the Iraq and the Gulf War. But anyway, he was seen as the father of a nation, so to speak, so he used his standing and his symbolism in order to really change the scores and to get support for it and for people and public opinion to think this was the right thing to do.

Even though they were, we were all still under occupation and being traumatized and terrorized. Still, he managed to do that. And in some ways he thought that if he played ball, if he was nice to the Americans and the West and so on, that he would gain recognition that he would gain stability for the Palestinian people. There would be legitimacy for the PLO. He really believed the promises made. He even believed the letter of assurances that was given to us by the American administration, which they reneged on; they never fulfilled anyway. Maybe that was naivety. Maybe that was the extreme optimism, but most Palestinians believed those things.

And Yasser Arafat thought that he could manipulate the situation. He told me once, if you give me an inch, I'll turn it into a meter or something, a centimeter. I said, they
won't give you a centimeter. They might promise you a millimeter and they might not give it to you at all. So be very careful. We know the Israelis. I wrote in the Madrid speech. We know you, I said. We, as people under occupation, we know our occupier. As opposed to the PLO people who did not see them, who did not know how Israel functioned, how Israel behaved, the mechanisms and dynamic of the occupation; pervasive and intrusive system of control and expansion and so on.

So he thought, no, this is the time where you can be smart enough to expand your rights, to negotiate even further, to get better deals and so on, which of course was exactly the opposite. Every time they negotiated, they got a worse deal. And they ended up dividing our land into areas A and B and C, which now is the chickens have come out to roost as well as annexing areas C altogether and B under its control and A, which is less than 20%, hey even invade daily and so on.

I think we had the negotiations deficit, the negotiation skills deficit, because before you sign any agreement or try to sell it to your leadership, you have to take into account everything. You have to look at every word, what is said, what is unsaid, and particularly given the power asymmetry.

I once told James Baker, you're asking us to do something entirely illegal. You're asking the occupied to negotiate their freedom with the occupiers, which violates international humanitarian law and fourth Geneva Convention. And he kept saying, Jerusalem, our capital. He was fully obsessed with Jerusalem. He kept saying, people see it far, we see it near. Because he had confidence in, in himself and the leaders and the people, I don't know. But he was sure that he was going the right way until, I think, the second Intifada, until he saw that Israel had no intention whatsoever to implement anything, let alone to negotiate a better deal.

**Gemma Ware:** It's remarkable, really, to hear from Hanan Ashrawi that despite her involvement in those Madrid negotiations, she actually knew nothing about the Oslo process until the very last minute.

**James Rodgers:** Yes, there's a lot to think about there. But one thing I think it might be useful to explain, Gemma, Dr. Ashrawi used the term: right of return. This is the demand that Palestinians who fled homes in what was Palestine before the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, and their descendants be allowed to return to property and land where they and their ancestors lived. Now, of course, the Oslo process did lead to some of the Palestine Liberation Organization's leadership being allowed to return from exile. But you also see there that that, in a sense, added extra complexity. As Dr. Ashrawi points out, their perspective was different from that of Palestinians like her, who had not been living in exile, but had been living under Israeli military occupation.

**Amnon Aran:** Dr. Ashrawi just shared with us her perspective on Israeli and American intentions behind Oslo. And we're about to hear now a different view from an Israeli who was integral to the process and very central to it – Dr. Yossi Beilin.
Dr. Beilin was a long time confident and political ally of foreign minister, Shimon Peres, and he had been prompting and promoting for many years, a domestic, liberal, progressive agenda for Israel within the Israeli Labor party, and the idea that Israel should be negotiating with the PLO and realizing the two-state solution.

During the Oslo process itself, Dr. Beilin served as deputy foreign minister in the Rabin government and subsequently as the minister of justice under prime minister Ehud Barak. We started by asking him what were the biggest challenges he experienced during the Oslo process.

**Yossi Beilin:** The more, I would say substantial issues were not so substantial because we did not touch the permanent agreement. Our mandate was the mandate of the Madrid conference, which referred only to an interim agreement of five years. So, the questions were in many ways secondary, like the size of the Palestinian parliament. Or the size of their government and many other things like that, which were not too difficult to compromise on.

There were some crisis and people cried. It was very emotional and it was not simple, but I cannot say that it was Jerusalem or the refugees which made – no, because we did not deal with this issue. We just mentioned them as five issues that should be dealt with towards the permanent agreement in five years. But we did not mention the way to solve it.

And when I came to Rabin, in about March or April, saying to him, we have a partner, we can talk to them. It is a meeting of the stars. I mean, it may not repeat itself. And just delaying the permanent agreement by five years, you never know what might happen. Especially if we are giving the extremists on both sides the opportunity to thwart our interim agreement, in order not to get to a permanent one. And he said, “Yeah, I mean, you have a point, but I want to stick to Madrid.” Because Madrid was the American baby. And he did not want to move from the American, I would say, Pax Americana. Although, the Americans were not part of Oslo, they didn't know about Oslo. So, on the one hand, he hid the Oslo story from the Americans. And, when they understood that something was happening there, he dismissed the importance of Oslo, while speaking to the American decision makers, but on the other hand, he didn't want to invent something which was totally out of the context of the Madrid conference.

So I believe that the biggest mistake was not to try and go directly to the permanent agreement. But I must say that talking to the Palestinians about it.

Some of them also were not ready for a permanent agreement, like Abu Alaa, the chief negotiator; who told me, Yossi, it is premature. We need to build our institutions like you did before you declared your independence in '48. In order to have a state. I mean, we cannot just create a state out of the blue. So, eventually, I believed that Rabin was right, Abu Alaa was right. And still, we were all mistaken by not trying to get to a permanent agreement, even if we were not 100% ready for that.
James Rodgers: What was the extent to which the Israeli public support process at its height?

Yossi Beilin: It’s difficult to describe what happened in the streets. In the beginning, people came with flowers to the soldiers. I mean, the demonstrations of hope on both sides was unbelievable. Unbelievable. People really wanted to believe that we made peace with the Palestinians.

And this was a decision of one person, and his name is Bill Clinton. Clinton was a young president with no international experience. He needed one. He needed a success. And he got it as a surprise. He did not have to do anything in order to have a historic agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

He decided to have a very emotional ceremony on the White House lawn. And, he put pressure on Rabin to participate. Rabin did not want to participate. Rabin hoped that it could be still a more low-profile event. But all those who were old enough to watch TV in ’93 remember a tall, young guy hugging two older leaders who shook hands reluctantly or not reluctantly, but it seemed like peace.

So, immediately when there was violence or when there was breaching of the peace process. People said, ‘How come? I mean, they had peace and they now, what is it? Another war?’ And it was difficult to tell them, you know what? Oslo was an interim agreement in which we only refer to the issues that we should talk about towards peace. It was not the peace itself. Because if this was the case, why the big noise about it? You could be more modest in your ceremonies. So I believe that the ceremony, and I told Clinton that, that the ceremony was too big.

Amnon Aran: I just wanted to really move to, actually, the period when you served in the two Labor governments: the Rabin-Peres government and subsequently the Barak government; that actually led the Oslo process towards the Palestinians. And I wanted to ask, in your view, what were the most significant decisions those governments took, in terms of shaping the process?

Yossi Beilin: For the Rabin government, it was the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO because we did not have to do that. If I’m going back to my original plan, the meeting with the PLO should have been a secret one. It was after we changed the law, which forbade us from meeting PLO people. And that was also a real challenge. And during the negotiations, we decided to mutually recognize each other. And that was not a simple decision for Rabin and Peres. Especially for Rabin, who was very much anti any contacts with the PLO, even after the law passed and it was legal to meet with them. So this was, I believe, the biggest issue for him.

For Barak, I think that when he came to power, he did not have a real picture about what kind of compromises was he going to accept. When I first spoke with him seriously about what we can offer. He spoke about a Palestinian state on 48% of the
land of the West Bank. And when I said to him, it is no go. I mean, no, no chance. You are speaking about a percentage which you know, no Palestinian could accept. He said, yes, I will convince them. Eventually he was the one who offered 91% to the Palestinians in the Camp David talks. And then he was ready to go even further when he accepted the Clinton parameters of December 24th, 2000. And was ready for 6%. Meaning 94% for the Palestinians and 6% for Israel. So, I think that for him, his own readiness, on the one hand, to give up on such a big part of the West Bank, and also to share the Temple Mount, were the most important decisions.

Newscips

Amnon Aran: Really speaking about the centrality of prime ministers, in November 1995, Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated. Can you share with us your assessment of what was the impact of the assassination in the broader context of the various factors that ultimately shaped the Oslo process?

Yossi Beilin: It had an unbelievable impact. Immediately after the assassination, we were all shocked. But, when the question was whether this was the assassination of the peace process, all of us, including myself, said, no way. Now we should even double our efforts to make peace. But in many ways, the assassination was a big success for the murderer. He wanted to stop it, and he did stop it. What happened was that on the Palestinian side, they understood the vulnerability of Israel. We could not believe that something like that could happen in Israel. And the fact that it happened showed them that even if they sign an agreement with an Israeli prime minister, it doesn't mean that it is going to be implemented. So this is one thing.

Many of them said that it was the end of the peace process. They couldn't believe that there was somebody courageous like him who would take upon himself the responsibility to continue. And the fact that Netanyahu was elected, of course, Netanyahu promised to cancel the Oslo agreement. He didn't cancel it, but he killed it actually in his own way. And his own way was very clever from his point of view. He said, why should I cancel it and confront America and the whole world? Because the whole world was so excited about Oslo. I will keep it and I will make the interim agreement a permanent one. And this is what he did. He took an interim agreement, a bridge of ropes, and used it as a permanent bridge. And then he's still wondering why the other side doesn't implement forever its commitments.

Now, this is the case today. I mean, no government in Israel ever abolished or even threatened to abolish the Oslo Agreement. And this is the big failure of Oslo. Not that it was a wrong decision to go for Oslo. And not that it died, but it is still alive. It shouldn't be alive. We had to finish the work by May 4th, '99. That was the deadline for a permanent agreement. When it didn't happen, we should have cancelled it and go directly for a permanent agreement whenever we could. But at that date, nothing happened. It was not even mentioned that the parties did not get to a permanent agreement because they didn't negotiate. So, nobody expected that on May 4th, '99,
something would happen under Netanyahu. And we, in our government, under Barak, which came to power in July ’99, failed to have an agreement with the Palestinians. Not only because we did not have a partner, we did have a partner, but because we did not know how to negotiate.

Now, this doesn't mean that the other side was a saint. I mean, the violence of those who were ready to sacrifice their lives in order to thwart our efforts, was the main reason for our disability to go for a permanent agreement. So, we were wrong, or I can speak for myself, I was wrong, by, I would say, even being enchanted by the polls, which say that on both sides, huge majorities supported Oslo.

Because, in order to thwart it, you don't need a majority, not even a big minority. You need some lunatics. And we did not expect this kind of violence on neither side; neither the Baruch Goldstein and the massacre in Hebron, which killed 29 Palestinian worshippers. Nor the suicide terrorists, who killed so many people. And of course, in an atmosphere of such high level of violence, it was very difficult to continue with the process.

**Gemma Ware:** The point that Beilin makes there about the violence from extremists on both sides, that followed the Oslo Accords signing ceremony is really striking, isn't it? There was this peace process, but this wasn't peace.

**James Rodgers:** Yes, he was referring there in particular to the attack in Hebron in early 1994, so not long after the signing, where a Jewish settler opened fire on Palestinian worshippers, killing 29 of them. And I think one thing that causes particular horror is the violent death of people at prayer, whatever the religion or place of worship.

And, I think there are a couple of important points to make here, Gemma. Firstly, the importance of faith in this conflict. I would argue that in this century, religion has been increasingly evident in politics on both sides, in simple terms at least. Secular nationalism replaced by something with a much more religious dimension.

And the second thing, and this is something that Jan Egeland also referred to in episode one, is the ability of acts of violence by extremists on both sides to influence the fate of broader, more moderate majorities.

As Dr. Beilin put it, talking about the killing of Yitzhak Rabin— in many ways the assassination was a big success for the murderer. And the same can be said of the suicide bombing campaign carried out by Palestinian groups on Israeli buses and other civilian targets. Their success, if it can be called that, was to put massive obstacles in the path of peace.
Gemma Ware: And we've heard in this episode some really great insights from Hanan Ashrawi and Yossi Beilin on what happened during the 1990s in this Oslo process period. But where has that left us 30 years on?

Amnon Aran: Yes Gemma, we've just heard two different perspectives from an Israeli and a Palestinian; two insiders about the Oslo process. And next week, we will really be looking into the legacy of the Oslo Accords, 30 years on.

Gemma Ware: Okay, thanks very much, James and Amnon.

James Rodgers: Yes, thank you, Gemma, and we're looking forward to the next episode.

Amnon Aran: Thank you very much, Gemma.

Gemma Ware: That's it for this episode of Inside the Oslo Accords from The Conversation Weekly. It was produced by Mend Mariwany, with assistance from Katie Flood. Sound design was by Eloise Stevens, and our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. Stephen Khan is our global executive editor and Alice Mason runs our social media. You can find us on X, formerly known as Twitter at @tc_audio on Instagram @theconversationdotcom, or email us directly at podcast@theconversation.com. If you like what we do, please support our podcast and The Conversation more broadly by going to donate.theconversation.com. And if you can, please do give us a rating or review wherever you listen to your podcasts.

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