HAWAI'I STUDIES ON KOREA

## CRISIS IN NORTH KOREA

The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956



ANDREI LANKOV ological ng "faced until iticism" olar told hey had Kim So ty who,

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of actual opposition members was followed to exile, or the execution chamber by those who presumably to The a group of the execution chamber by those who presumably knew about prison, or the execution the first victims denounced under not the execution of the exe prison, or the execution of the first victims denounced under pressure and their plans and whom the first victims denounced under pressure and their plans are their plans and their plans are their plans are their plans. their plans and the turn were followed by their friends and associates, to turn have known something. It meant that the purely the latter in turn were followed by their friends and associates, to turn the purely that the purely the property is the purely the purely the purely that the torture. The late who will be the second associates, who might have known something. It meant that the number of purge who might growing continuously and at times work. who might have a tendency to develop into a rate victims kept of very rapidly. Such nitch hunts always have a tendency to develop into a self-perpetuating

Apart from the dissenting intellectuals, the main victims of these Apart is and occasionally Pak Chiona in a connections with purges the large of the West's and occasionally Pak Ch'ang-ok, often by virtue of simply being members of the Yan'an or the Soviet faction (though, as mentioned above, the Soviet Koreans were seldom targeted at this early stage). As Yi Tae-p'il, vice-chairman of the Pyongyang City Committee, had told Titorenko in October 1957, one of the tasks of party organizations was to "expose unreliable elements." 33 And there appeared to be an abundance of "unreliable elements." For example, in the Ministry of Justice, as the deputy minister related to a Soviet diplomat in October 1957, "It is possible to say that in the legal, judicial, and procuratorial systems no leading official has retained his previous post." Among those who lost their positions in the legal system were the minister of justice and the attorney general themselves, who were both purged for being "too soft" on the counterrevolutionaries. Other victims of the purge included adeputy minister, the deputy attorney general, and the head of the Supreme Court, as well as some heads of departments in the Ministry of Justice (some of them were proclaimed "factionalists" whereas others Were accused of lacking "revolutionary vigilance"). 34 Such a develop-Ment is not surprising, if one takes into consideration the significance of this ministry during the purges. In late 1958 a high-level North Korean executive told a Soviet diplomat that 3,912 members had been expelled from the KWP during the year from July 1, 1957 to July 1, 1958. Most of them were accused of being supporters of Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik. 35 Also, 6,116 members died during this period, so that the number of dead and purged members combined (10,028) precisely equaled the number of Crease during this period (the KWP had 1,181,095 members and 18,023

