



THREAT INSIGHT The New Zealand Terrorism Threat Environment

Issued: 27 November 2020

20-231-TI

(R) This Threat Insight (TI) provides an annual update to the New Zealand terrorism threat environment. This TI informs but does not review the New Zealand terrorism threat level, which is undertaken separately.¹

(R) CTAG has MODERATE confidence in our assessments, which are informed by a range of domestic and international sources. A range of agencies and subject matter experts were consulted in preparing this TI.

Executive Summary

1. (R) Violent extremist narratives continue to evolve in New Zealand, influenced by concerning international trends. However, the drivers of terrorism in New Zealand have remained largely stable. The 2019 Christchurch terrorist attacks, grievances associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, international developments including political and social tensions, and the online environment, have all influenced the New Zealand terrorism threat environment over the past year.
2. (R) Identity-Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE) and Faith-Motivated Violent Extremism (FMVE) remain the key ideologies of known potential threat actors in New Zealand. However, a continuously developing understanding of violent extremism continues to draw CTAG's awareness to potentially extreme fringes of other ideologies and movements that exist in New Zealand.
3. (R) Over the next 12 months we continue to assess a lone actor, inspired by any ideology, mobilising to terrorist violence without intelligence forewarning is a realistic possibility and the most likely attack scenario in New Zealand.
4. (R) Over the same timeframe, there will likely be an increase in adherence to IMVE ideologies – notably White Identity Extremism (WIE) – in New Zealand, and the emergence of a New Zealand-based IMVE group openly advocating violence is a realistic possibility.
5. (R) The loss of influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has highly likely contributed to a decline in the breadth of support for ISIL-inspired FMVE in New Zealand. While ISIL retains support globally, including domestically, a resurgent ISIL, a potential new splinter group, or significant new FMVE group will likely result in an increase in individuals who adhere to the group and their ideology in New Zealand.
6. (R) Global developments and trends will continue to have an enduring influence on New Zealand-based extremists. In the long-term, it is likely that consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic will have a detrimental effect on the New Zealand terrorism threat environment.
7. (R) The New Zealand terrorism threat environment is subject to change at short notice; this report is current as of date of publication. CTAG continually monitors the terrorism threat environment and issues reporting as necessary.

Trends in the New Zealand terrorism threat environment

¹ (R) For a description of CTAG's core concepts see 20-230-TI and for an overview of CTAG's violent extremist terminology see Annex A.

8. (R) **Overall, CTAG judges there has been no significant change to the New Zealand terrorism threat environment over the past year, notwithstanding our improved understanding of the presence of diverse and sometimes overlapping extremist ideologies and movements.** The 15 March 2019 Christchurch terrorist attacks, grievances associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, other major international developments and the online environment continue to influence extremist narratives in New Zealand.
9. (R) **The Christchurch attacks continue to influence violent extremism in New Zealand.** The attacks, associated livestream video and manifesto continue to circulate online and the attacker is still referenced by violent extremists globally. We judge the attacker and his actions, and associated propaganda, will continue to influence the New Zealand terrorism threat environment in the long-term. Several attacks globally have been at least partially inspired by the Christchurch attacks **s6(a)**. We therefore continue to assess there remains a realistic possibility the Christchurch attacks could inspire a retaliatory or copycat attack in New Zealand in the medium to long-term.
10. (R) **There is a realistic possibility COVID-19 will have medium to long-term adverse effects on the New Zealand terrorism threat environment.** During New Zealand's various COVID-19 alert level three and four lockdowns and resulting social isolation, there was likely greater exposure to online extremist content due to increased time spent online and the volume of shared misinformation, particularly about the origins of the virus. We assess there is a realistic possibility a manifestation of this time online, and potential future restrictions, will result in increased numbers of radicalised individuals in the long-term. We assess it is likely the consequences of the pandemic, such as online radicalisation and the emergence of COVID-19 specific grievances or conspiracy theories amongst a small portion of the population, will have a detrimental effect on the terrorism threat environment in the long-term [128/20/TA refers].
11. (R) **Over the past 12 months, international political developments, events and extreme ideologies have shaped the New Zealand terrorism threat environment:**
 - a. (R) The COVID-19 pandemic, racial tensions across the West, ongoing conflict in the Middle East, and global religious tensions are assessed as having influenced the New Zealand terrorism threat environment this year. We assess global developments and trends will likely continue to influence New Zealand-based extremists, and this will likely have a detrimental impact on the overall threat environment in the medium to long-term.
 - b. (R) Potentially extreme fringes of international ideologies and movements, particularly those emanating from the United States (US), and of which we previously understood had a limited presence in New Zealand, have become more apparent over 2020. This includes ideologies and movements such as QAnon, COVID-19 related conspiracy theories, involuntary celibacy (incel)² and sovereign citizens.³ Reporting suggests these ideas have influenced the individualised ideologies of extremists in New Zealand over the past year.
12. (R) **The online environment continues to enable, drive and propagate violent extremist narratives.** The radicalising effect of global online extremist narratives means threat actors inspired by various ideologies can emerge with little or no forewarning. We judge the online environment is permissive for violent extremists due to anonymity, encryption, the ease of connection regardless of locality, and the inability of security agencies, law enforcement and legislation to keep up with the pace of technological change. We assess the online environment will highly likely continue to be an enabling platform for violent extremists over the coming 12 months as technology continues to advance at a rapid pace.

² Incels advocate for the subjugation of women and a return to their interpretation of traditional gender-specific roles in society. Incel violent extremists seek to commit violence in support of their belief that society unjustly denies them sexual or romantic attention.

³ Sovereign citizens are members of an international movement and ideology that question the legitimacy of modern government.

Extremist Ideologies in New Zealand

13. (R) Our understanding of a range of extremist issues and ideologies is broadening following continued efforts across government to further develop a baseline understanding of the broad spectrum of potentially extreme ideologies present in New Zealand [See Annex A for CTAG's violent extremism framework].
14. (R) We assess over the past year, many of these extremist ideologies have grown in popularity internationally, highly likely due to an increase in grievances driven by COVID-19, perceived marginalisation due to societal changes, ongoing global racial tensions, and the proliferation of online extremist rhetoric and sub-cultures, which are merging with mainstream ideas. While many of them are not inherently violent, we assess they may provide pathways to radicalisation to more extreme or violent ideologies. We note ideologies are not exclusive and individuals may adopt multiple ideologies or adhere to multiple ideological subsets.

Identity-Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE)

15. (R) **There are almost certainly individuals in New Zealand who advocate the use of violence to promote their own identity or denigrate the identity of others.** IMVE in New Zealand comprises a broad range of subsets including advocating violence targeting others based on their ethnicity, race, gender or sexuality. We have no information to suggest any such individuals in New Zealand have the current intent to mobilise to terrorist violence.
16. (R) **The Christchurch attacks continue to influence New Zealand-based IMVE.** The cancellation of commemorative events due to COVID-19, combined with the attacker's later guilty plea, likely resulted in less domestic and international media coverage, and therefore fewer related incidents and extremist rhetoric over the past year. **s6(a)**
[REDACTED]. Our understanding of the impact of the attacker's sentencing and designation as a terrorist entity is developing. However, there has been no obvious immediate change to the New Zealand terrorism threat environment.
17. (R) **Since the Christchurch attacks, increased numbers of New Zealand-based White Identity Extremists (WIE) continue to come to our attention.** We note WIE ideologies are often intertwined with a range of other ideologies including faith-based motivations, violent misogyny, eco-fascism, and other single issues. **s6(a)**
[REDACTED]
18. (R) **Reporting suggests subsets of IMVE ideologies that were previously understood as having a limited presence in New Zealand have become more apparent over the past year, although support likely remains limited.** **s6(a)**
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Outlook

19. (R) **We judge there will likely be an increase in adherence to IMVE ideologies in New Zealand over the next 12 months.** We assess this will likely be driven by global issues such as rising nationalism as a result of countries looking inwards during the COVID-19 pandemic, a global increase in IMVE, conspiracy theories linked to COVID-19, and crisis narratives emerging from international events such as the US Election. We note these events will likely be exploited by IMVE to promote their anti-government and WIE ideologies.
20. (R) **We assess the emergence of an IMVE group openly advocating violence in New Zealand is a realistic possibility over the next 12 months.** This is consistent with international experiences of IMVE and the formulation of more extreme violent groups such as Antipodean Resistance established in

Australia in October 2016 and The Base, established in 2018 and centred in the US with international chapters. **s6(a)**

Politically-Motivated Violent Extremism (PMVE)

21. (R) **There is a realistic possibility there are individuals in New Zealand who adhere to PMVE ideologies.** Adherents to PMVE promote the use of violence to achieve change to or within an existing political system, such as fascists, Marxists, anarchists, and others with anti-government ideologies. We judge that many of these ideologies are likely influenced by emerging international trends, such as political changes and/or populist nationalist politics rather than specific events in New Zealand. However, New Zealand-based extremists may believe these issues apply to the New Zealand context through their interpretation of different crisis narratives.

22. (R) **s6(a)**
s6(a)
s6(a) We have sighted information to suggest anti-government narratives driven by COVID-19, associated conspiracy theories, and international movements (such as QAnon) have emerged in New Zealand over the past year. We assess this is a reflection of a global rise in anti-government rhetoric, due in part to a mistrust in government handling of the pandemic. We note violent extremist groups and individuals globally have exploited these narratives, by way of furthering their anti-government agendas. Such narratives have also emerged in New Zealand as a result of misinformation shared online and extreme ideas, such as those relating to conspiracy theories, becoming more widely accepted.

23. (R) **s6(a)**
s6(a) we note adherents to PMVE such as QAnon supporters, have carried out or attempted to carry out acts of ideologically-motivated violence in the US. We assess there is a realistic possibility that anti-government views will be used as pathways to more extreme ideologies for a small portion of individuals, and any such developments will probably have a long-term adverse impact on the New Zealand terrorism threat environment.

Outlook

24. (R) **We assess there is a realistic possibility anti-government narratives will increase domestically over the next 12 months and will be utilised by New Zealand-based PMVE groups and individuals to promote their ideologies.** We assess anti-government narratives will likely be driven by the government's ongoing response to the COVID-19 pandemic and any associated conspiracy theories, such as those relating to the origin of the virus (including allegations of a "plandemic") and future vaccination programmes, as well as the perception that offshore crises are present domestically or are impacting on New Zealand's interests. In line with our understanding of threat actors in New Zealand, we assess any mobilisation to violence by a PMVE-aligned individual in New Zealand would most likely be as a lone actor. However, we assess a small cell with anti-government sentiment mobilising to violence remains a realistic possibility.

Faith-Motivated Violent Extremism (FMVE)

25. (R) **There are almost certainly individuals in New Zealand who adhere to FMVE ideologies.** **s6(a)**
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s6(a) We assess ISIL's ability to radicalise individuals in New Zealand has highly likely declined over the past year due to an overall loss of influence and the collapse of the physical caliphate in the Middle East.

26. (R) **We assess it is likely that individuals adhering to other FMVE ideologies are present in New Zealand.** **s6(a)**

s6(a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] There is a realistic possibility individuals in New Zealand motivated by an extreme interpretation of their religion or spiritual belief may mobilise to terrorist violence in the medium to long-term. s6(a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Outlook

- 27. (R) **Over the next 12 months, CTAG assesses emerging FMVE trends overseas will highly likely shape FMVE ideologies in New Zealand.** We assess a global resurgence of ISIL or the emergence of a significant new or splinter faction of an existing FMVE group will likely result in a small increase in individuals who adhere to the group and their ideology in New Zealand. s6(a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Single Issue-Motivated Violent Extremism (SMVE)

- 28. (R) **There are likely individuals and groups present in New Zealand who condone the use of violence to achieve a specific outcome on a single issue, aligned to one or several PMVE, IMVE and FMVE ideologies.** Issues may include those that emerge in response to large events, crises, or political or social changes globally or within New Zealand, such as anti-1080 poison, anti-abortion, animal rights, and anti-vaccination, among others. While many single issues will fluctuate in line with international or domestic trends, some remain focussed on seeking to influence or change policies within New Zealand.
- 29. (R) **There is a realistic possibility that if single issues are prolonged, they will provide a gateway to further or more extreme ideologies.** We assess an extreme interpretation of a single issue will likely have a long-term detrimental impact on the New Zealand terrorism threat environment due to the gradual radicalisation of some individuals. We have no information to suggest there are individuals in New Zealand who currently have the intent to mobilise to terrorist violence in support of single issues.

Outlook

- 30. (R) **Over the next year, we assess there will likely be an increase in extremist individuals motivated by single issues.** While not unique to SMVE, some drivers of extremism in New Zealand will likely be exacerbated by COVID-19, including declining social, economic, and health conditions. There is a realistic possibility this could encourage some individuals to mobilise to terrorist violence in support of single issues over the next 12 months. Due to the personal nature of many single issues, we assess a SMVE attack in New Zealand would most likely be conducted by a lone actor, previously unknown to security agencies and law enforcement.

Threat actors

- 31. s6(a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- 32. (R) **Over the past year, we have increasingly observed instances of young individuals under the age of 18 in New Zealand adhering to violent extremist ideologies.** We assess this is likely due to readily accessible extremist material and recruitment propaganda online, gaming culture, access to modern technology, and increased youth engagement with prominent polarising issues, such as climate change. We judge youth may seek engagement with violent extremist ideologies to attain a sense of belonging and to be part of a likeminded community. We note these individuals could present a credible terrorism threat to New Zealand, despite their age.

33. (R) **Several recent international examples demonstrate the increased threat of individuals with an extreme ideology serving in Western security forces, particularly in militaries.** For example, in June 2020 Germany disbanded a special forces company after investigations exposed widespread WIE support within its ranks. We assess individuals with an extremist ideology may seek to join security forces for a number of reasons including patriotism, nationalism, specialised weapons training and gaining operational combat skills. If an individual in the military, or with military experience were to conduct an attack in New Zealand, it would highly likely be at a higher sophistication than a member of the public due to their specialised training and expertise, and access to tactical equipment. **s6(a)**

34. **s6(a)**

35. (R) **There is a realistic possibility that imprisoned violent extremists could present a threat from within prison or upon their release into the community, by conducting an act of terrorist violence.**⁴ Overseas examples demonstrate the possibility of this occurring. For example, a convicted terrorist within an Australian prison was charged with Engaging in a Terrorist Act after stabbing another prisoner in October 2020. Further, several terrorist attacks across the West have occurred after violent extremists were released back into the community. **s6(a)**

Outlook

36. (R) **Over the next 12 months we continue to assess a lone actor, inspired by any ideology, mobilising to violence without intelligence forewarning is a realistic possibility and the most likely attack scenario in New Zealand.** A majority of terrorist attacks occurring in the West over the past five years, have been conducted by lone actors either previously known or unknown to security and law enforcement agencies. **s6(a)**

Radicalisation

37. (R) **There is no single pathway to radicalisation and this process is highly individualised.** We note there are certain environments or events, which may accelerate the process of radicalisation among a small portion of individuals in New Zealand. This may include but is not limited to, influential global terrorist attacks, such as the Christchurch attacks, the online environment, and time in prison alongside radicalising influences.

⁴ For the purposes of this report, improvised violent extremists are individuals who are of national security concern and are under Corrections management.

38. (R) **The Christchurch attacks have almost certainly had an enduring influence on the radicalisation of New Zealand-based violent extremists over the past year.** We note the associated livestream video and manifesto remain available online despite measures attempting to remove them. Several incidents over the last year, including individuals at least partially inspired by the Christchurch attacks making online threats and consuming associated propaganda, as well as several arrests and reports of hate speech around the one-year anniversary of the attacks, highlight the attacks' ongoing influence.
39. (R) **The online environment will almost certainly continue to accelerate the process of radicalisation for a number of individuals.** The sharing of conspiracy theories, hate speech and extremist content online is growing and becoming more mainstream, and is being used by extremists globally to spread their ideologies. Exposure to this content may encourage radicalisation for vulnerable individuals and is further enabled by unique algorithms that provide suggestions to look at recommended content. We assess the lockdown and social distancing measures implemented in New Zealand to stop the spread of COVID-19 highly likely enabled a majority of New Zealanders to spend more time online. As a result, there is a realistic possibility that New Zealand-based individuals susceptible to, or already on the pathway towards, radicalisation were at increased risk of exposure to extremist content and accelerated radicalisation. We judge that in the medium-term there is a realistic possibility this could result in an increased number of individuals with an extreme ideology in New Zealand.
40. (R) **International examples demonstrate the potential for radicalisation within prisons.** In France, over 1000 current inmates have reportedly been assessed as radicalised and in the UK, one of two men who were convicted for trying to murder a prison officer in January 2020 was reportedly identified as having radicalised in prison. s6(a)

██████████ We note there is a realistic possibility individuals could self-radicalise in prison; however, there are significant limitations on their access to extremist narratives or propaganda.

Outlook

41. (R) **The Christchurch attacks will likely continue to have an ongoing radicalising influence among a small portion of individuals in New Zealand in the medium to long-term.** While the Christchurch attacker did not use his sentencing hearing as a platform to promote his ideology, the attacks highly likely remain influential to IMVE adherents in New Zealand and we regularly sight information to suggest it continues to at least partially inspire terrorist attacks globally. s6(a)
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- ██████████
- ██████████
42. (R) **The online environment will almost certainly remain a key enabler of radicalisation over the next year.** The online environment has played a key radicalisation role to date, enabling real-time access to international events, communication with other like-minded individuals, and easy access to extremist material. Ongoing technological developments will almost certainly provide new opportunities for extremists. Despite efforts of large companies such as Facebook and Twitter to de-platform extremist groups and related extremist content, individuals will almost certainly seek more permissive platforms, such as encrypted forums to access extremist material.

Targets and Locations

43. (R) **Potential terrorist attack targets and locations in New Zealand have unlikely been significantly impacted by COVID-19 over the past year.** In comparison to other countries, New Zealand's more severe COVID-19 restrictions were short-term and as a result, large gatherings, including at crowded places and places of worship, have operated as usual in most parts of New Zealand for the majority of the year.
44. s6(a)
- ██████████

s6(a)



45. (R) **We assess there is a large range of individuals or communities who could be targeted in a terrorist attack in New Zealand.** While some terrorist attacks are opportunistic such as the stabbing attack against people socialising at a park in Reading, United Kingdom in June 2020, others have targeted a specific community, such as the Christchurch attacks. We note targeting of particular individuals or communities is often dependent on the ideology of the individual threat actor, and their overall objectives. We note ethnic, religious, political, and minority communities or individuals have all been targeted by terrorist attacks internationally. s6(a)

_____ We assess a lone actor, who has not come to the attention of security agencies, could target any community in New Zealand with little or no intelligence forewarning.

Outlook

46. (R) **CTAG assesses over the next year, there is a realistic possibility terrorist attack targets will be shaped by how COVID-19 and associated economic and social impacts unfold and affect extremists individually.** Such impacts are also conditional on when or if widespread introduction of a successful COVID-19 vaccine or treatment occurs, and the persistence and severity of related restrictions. We note recent attacks in Nice, France and Vienna, Austria, took place shortly prior to second COVID-19 lockdowns. We judge that terrorists likely exploited the impending new restrictions as opportunities to conduct terrorist attacks in populated areas of cities before the restrictions were implemented. We acknowledge that the situation in New Zealand over the next 12 months is likely to remain dynamic. There is a realistic possibility further restrictions or potential vaccination programmes in New Zealand could be triggers for New Zealand-based violent extremists to conduct an act of terrorist violence.

Attack capability

47. (R) **Based on our understanding of known individuals and the availability of weaponry, attack capability highly likely remains at the unsophisticated end of the spectrum in New Zealand.**⁵ Terrorist capability in New Zealand typically consists of items and techniques available to most members of the public, such as bladed weapons, firearms, vehicles, blunt force instruments and materials that enable arson. Firearms attacks vary in sophistication, depending on the specific firearm used, training, reconnaissance and planning. s6(a)

⁵ See 20-230-TI CTAG glossary for capability spectrum included in the CTAG methodology.

Specific capabilities

- a. (R) **Basic weapons** - basic weapon attacks such as stabbings and vehicle rammings, demonstrate that readily available weapons can cause substantial casualties. Basic weapons are easily acquired and can be used in a variety of ways including with other weapons in mixed-mode attacks, for example using a vehicle to conduct a ramming followed by a bladed weapon attack.
- b. (R) **Firearms** - due to widespread availability and demonstrated effectiveness, we assess there is a realistic possibility firearms could be used as a terrorist weapon in New Zealand. We note IMVE ideology in particular often promotes firearm usage and training. We judge that while the New Zealand firearms law reform affected the supply and lethality of legal weapons, it has not impacted the ability for people to access firearms illegally.
- c. (R) **Tactical equipment** – tactical equipment such as firearm attachments, combat-style clothing, ballistic vests, helmets, airsoft equipment, night vision and thermal equipment could add lethality or survivability to an attack, and are readily available in New Zealand.
- d. (R) **Three dimensional (3D) printing** - we assess 3D printing is unlikely to be used in New Zealand for terrorist attack purposes over the coming 12 months, based on the availability of firearms in New Zealand and the lack of success internationally with 3D printed firearms. We are aware of a terrorist attack in Halle, Germany in October 2019 that incorporated 3D printed technology within firearms. We assess there is less need to produce 3D printed firearms in New Zealand, compared with countries that have heavily restricted access to firearms, including Germany and the UK.
- e. (R) **Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)** – most credible IEDs in New Zealand consist of small, crudely constructed pipe bombs. We note IEDs are a popular terrorist weapon internationally and can be easily concealed. ~~s6(a)~~
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~~_____~~ An IED attack in New Zealand is a realistic possibility, and would likely involve the use of homemade explosives, as their precursors are readily available and instructions for their assembly can be obtained online.
- f. (R) **Drones** – we assess drones are more likely to be used as tools for aerial target reconnaissance, rather than as a weapon in a terrorist attack, as demonstrated by previous attacks and the ease of assessing other inexpensive and more simplistic capabilities in New Zealand. We note that drones have been used internationally to carry small explosive devices.
- g. (R) **Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)** - terrorists globally continue to show interest in CBRN attack plotting. CBRN events in New Zealand typically involve “white powder” (e.g. fake anthrax) threats to government agencies, business and individuals. ~~s6(a)~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~ We assess a CBRN attack in New Zealand is unlikely, based on limited reporting regarding these capabilities in New Zealand.
- h. (R) **Cyber** - reporting indicates international terrorist groups are unlikely to be capable of undertaking malicious cyber activity, which would result in immediate physical harm to New Zealanders or New Zealand interests. We assess it is highly likely some terrorist groups and their supporters are capable of less sophisticated malicious cyber activity, such as website defacements, which support terrorist narratives without posing an immediate threat of physical harm. Cyber incidents affecting critical networks and systems could still result in subsequent harm to New Zealanders or New Zealand interests, particularly when such incidents result in essential public services being degraded, or inspire others to undertake terrorist attacks.

Outlook

48. (R) **We assess the most likely attack scenario over the next 12 months in New Zealand is a lone actor mobilising to violence without intelligence forewarning, using readily available weapons.** This is based on our understanding of terrorist attacks in other Western countries over the past five years as well as our understanding of current violent extremists in New Zealand. Readily available weapons may include firearms, bladed weapons and vehicles. A lower sophistication attack results in fewer observable indicators, reducing time for detection and disruption. We assess it is unlikely that significantly new terrorist capabilities will emerge in New Zealand or globally over the coming year. Current capabilities remain versatile, and weapons such as firearms, bladed weapons and vehicle rammings have been proven in successful recent attacks. We assess there is a realistic possibility current proven capabilities may be enhanced or altered to make them more lethal.

Conclusion

49. (R) CTAG assesses the New Zealand terrorism threat environment has remained largely stable over the past 12 months, notwithstanding the continued influence of the Christchurch attacks, and violent extremist narratives shaped by international events, such as COVID-19 and international ethnic tensions.
50. (R) Over the next year, we expect there to be some deterioration of the threat environment, due to the ongoing societal effects of COVID-19, and the continuation of international terrorism trends appearing in New Zealand. We assess the online environment will highly likely continue to be an enabler for violent extremists over the coming 12 months as technology continues to advance at a rapid pace. We continue to assess the Christchurch attacks will likely have an ongoing influence on the New Zealand terrorism threat environment in the medium to long-term.
51. (R) Our understanding of ideologies affecting the New Zealand terrorism threat environment continues to evolve. We currently assess White Identity Extremism IMVE and ISIL-inspired FMVE remain the primary violent extremist ideologies in New Zealand. However, over the next 12 months, we judge there will likely be an increase in adherence to a broader range of IMVE ideologies in New Zealand. We further assess there is a realistic possibility anti-government PMVE narratives will increase domestically and will be utilised by New Zealand-based extremists to promote their ideologies. COVID-19 is also likely to drive an increased number of individuals towards SMVE ideologies. We judge FMVE in New Zealand will highly likely continue to be shaped by emerging FMVE trends overseas despite a degradation of ISIL's global influence.
52. (R) Over the next 12 months we continue to assess a lone actor, inspired by any ideology, mobilising to violence without intelligence forewarning is a realistic possibility and is the most likely attack scenario in New Zealand.

s6(a)

Annex A: Violent Extremism Terminology

VIOLENT EXTREMISM

AN IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Refer 20-229-TI for more details



FMVE
FAITH-MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMISM
 Promoting the use of violence to advance one's own spiritual or religious objectives

PMVE
POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMISM
 Promoting the use of violence to achieve change to or within an existing political system

IMVE
IDENTITY-MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMISM
 Promoting the use of violence to advance one's own perception of identity and/or denigrate others' perceived identities

SMVE
SINGLE ISSUE-MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMISM
 Promoting the use of violence to achieve a specific outcome to a specific issue

Classification: RESTRICTED




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s6(a)



CTAG Threat Definitions

Likelihood Assessment	Threat Level
Terrorist attack, or violent protest, or violent crime is expected	EXTREME
Terrorist attack, or violent protest, or violent crime is assessed as highly likely	HIGH
Terrorist attack, or violent protest, or violent crime is assessed as feasible and could well occur	MEDIUM
Terrorist attack, or violent protest, or violent crime is assessed as a realistic possibility	LOW
Terrorist attack, or violent protest, or violent crime is assessed as unlikely	VERY LOW

Probabilistic language

<< Lower likelihood		Even chance		Higher likelihood >>	
Remote/Highly unlikely	Unlikely	Realistic possibility	Likely Probable Probably	Highly likely	Almost certain