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# The Struggle in Bangladesh

by Feroz Ahmed

Ever since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has been a geographical absurdity, with its two parts separated by one thousand miles of unfriendly Indian territory. Greater than the spatial distance was the difference in the social structure, economy and culture. Adherence to a common religion, Islam, was never sufficient to make these two dissimilar parts a single nation. But for almost twenty-four years Pakistan weathered all storms and maintained a precarious unity. That unity was finally broken in March 1971 when the West Pakistani military launched an all-out war to suppress the movement for regional autonomy in East Pakistan, forcing the region to declare itself an independent People's Republic of Bangladesh. The genocidal attacks of the West Pakistani army against the Bengali people and the agony of the millions of refugees who were forced to flee to India have now become a familiar story.<sup>1</sup> While focussing their attention on the massacre and the inhuman conditions of the refugees, the Western media have by and large ignored the roots of the crisis. The most common explanation of the conflict, i.e. traditional hatred between the Bengalis and Punjabis, misses the point entirely. In this brief article I shall attempt to show that the conflict in Pakistan is a synergetic product of the United States' foreign policy operating within Pakistan's social structure.

## Social Structure

Basic to the understanding of political developments in any country is the analysis of its social structure. Here I shall not attempt to discuss the economic

rationale for the creation of Pakistan,<sup>2</sup> but shall begin with the social structure inherited by Pakistan at the time of its creation.

The regions which came to constitute the state of Pakistan had traditionally been the suppliers of raw materials to the industries located in other parts of India and in England. East Bengal (or East Pakistan) grew jute, the so-called golden fiber, for West Bengal factories. It did not have a single jute mill of its own. West Pakistan produced wheat and cotton which it exchanged for manufactured goods produced elsewhere. The emerging industrial capitalist class of India was almost totally non-Muslim, and the commercial life of the regions which later became Pakistan was dominated by Hindu and other non-Muslim businessmen. While landlords and peasants in the West were Muslims, in East Pakistan rural life was stratified along religious lines, with almost all landlords being Hindus and almost all rural Muslims being peasants.

The partition and the consequent emigration of Hindu landlords to India created an enormous power vacuum in East Bengal. The land left behind by the Hindus was redistributed among the peasants, 52 per cent of whom own their own land, with family farms averaging 3.5 acres. In the urban areas, the Bengali elite consisted of the elements of the decaying Muslim aristocracy, represented by the regional Muslim League. In the absence of an urban bourgeois class and real economic power of the aristocracy, the emerging petty-bourgeoisie, constituted

ted of small traders, shopkeepers, professional people, teachers and clerks, became the potentially most important class. Culturally, the influence of this class was predominant, but economically it was weak.

In West Pakistan, which also lacked a bourgeois class, the absentee landlords became the most powerful class. However, the landlords were not politically well-organized and they lacked the capability of running a state which had inherited many modern institutions from the British colonialists. The bureaucracy, which was trained by the British as an instrument of colonial rule, became the most effective political force in its own right. Although this bureaucracy had strong links with the landlord class, the needs of a modern state and the chaotic conditions of the partition enabled it to become a semi-autonomous social force and to fill the vacuum created by the departure of the British. The bureaucracy was drawn almost entirely from the Punjab province and the Urdu-speaking refugees who had settled in Sind. The third political force was the military, again British-trained and drawn mainly from the Punjab. But the political influence of the military was limited in the beginning.<sup>3</sup>

West Pakistan also received, among its immigrants, traders belonging to the Memon, Bohra and Khoja communities of Gujrat and Bombay who settled in Karachi. These and other commercial elements later transformed themselves into an industrial capitalist class. Because of their small size, narrow community base, and lack of roots in Pakistan, these industrial entrepreneurs never asserted themselves as a political force. Their marriage of convenience with the bureaucrats at least ensured them policies supporting their enterprise.

Because of the virtual absence of capitalists, feudal landlords, bureaucracy and the military in East Pakistan, the West Pakistani power structure became the national power structure as well,

ruling the eastern part with the collaboration of the dying Muslim aristocracy.

### Colonization of East Bengal

At independence, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of East Pakistan exceeded the GDP of West Pakistan (Table 1). Education was also more extensive in the East than in the West (Table 2). But given the economic disruption of the partition and the difference in the social structures in East and West Pakistan, in addition to certain advantages of economic infrastructure in West Pakistan, inevitably the industrialization of Pakistan turned the eastern region into a colony of the West and created disparities in economic and social development of the two regions.

The process of industrialization in Pakistan began with the investment of capital in cotton textile industries in West Pakistan and jute mills in East Pakistan by the commercial bourgeoisie of West Pakistan. The development of industries in East Pakistan was carried out only to the extent that it benefited the West Pakistani capitalists. It was not simply a profit-making enterprise but an essential condition for the industrial development of West Pakistan itself. Availability of certain raw materials, such as cotton; presence of economic infrastructure, such as the seaport of Karachi, railways and roads; location of the central government and financial institutions; and lesser militancy of the proletariat offered a more suitable climate for investment in West Pakistan. But such industrialization required importation of capital goods and some essential raw materials. Development of the jute industry in the East by West Pakistani capitalists, therefore, amounted to increasing the capacity of foreign exchange earning, since East Pakistan, producer of more than 80% of the world's jute, had ready-made world markets. In the early years, the export of raw and processed jute accounted for 70% of Pakistan's foreign exchange earning. This foreign exchange was used for the industrialization of West Pakistan. East

Pakistan received only 25-30% of the total imports (Table 3).

Thus penetration of West Pakistan-based capital into East Pakistan not only established an antagonistic relationship between the Bengali worker and the West Pakistani capitalist, but it set off a process of draining East Pakistan's resources for the industrial development of West Pakistan. Policies imposed in order to guarantee cheap raw materials for the factories resulted in the exploitation and increased impoverishment of the Bengali peasants. Such policies were adopted and enforced on behalf of the West Pakistani capitalists by the bureaucracy which was also largely West Pakistani. Not trusting the Bengalis, the West Pakistani capitalists brought along with them West Pakistani managers for their factories, many of them trained in the University of Pennsylvania-initiated business school in Karachi.

The members of the Bengali petty-bourgeoisie who aspired to have a slice of the industrial cake or to obtain civil and military positions and managerial jobs in industry found the West Pakistani ruling structure and its local allies obstructing their development. Thus all the classes of East Pakistan -- the proletariat, the peasantry and the petty-bourgeoisie -- stood in an antagonistic relationship with the West Pakistani power structure and their local collaborators.

In addition to the exploitation of East Pakistan's raw materials and cheap labor, the third important ingredient of classical colonialism -- using the colony as a market for the mother country's manufactures -- was also present from the inception of Pakistan. Table 4 shows the relative values of exports of one region to the other, with West Pakistan consistently having a favorable balance of trade. With the industrialization of West Pakistan, the need for the captive market in East Pakistan grew more acute, and manufactured goods began to occupy a much larger share of the exports to East Pakistan. The pattern of industrial development was based on the assumption that the East Pakistani market would consume

a significant part of West Pakistani manufactures, since these high-cost products could not compete in the world market. Cotton textiles, which constituted the largest single item in West Pakistan exports to East Pakistan, faced stiff competition in the world market. On the other hand, the largest item in East Pakistan's list of exports to the West was tea, which is a popular item of consumption in West Pakistan but which could always find a place in the world market. In fact, in recent years Pakistan had drastically curtailed her exports of tea, leaving the market largely to two neighboring countries, India and Ceylon.

Thus in the context of Pakistan's given social structure, economic program amounted to tightening West Pakistan's power structure and perpetuating further exploitation of East Pakistan. The only way to break this vicious cycle was to redefine the social relationships and organize production along socialist lines. That was the only guarantee of national unity. But such a program could not possibly be conceived by the exploiting classes. They chose a path which only aggravated the existing relationships between the two regions.

#### Imperialism from Without Promotes Colonialism from Within

The colonization of East Bengal was inherent in the power vacuum created by the partition, especially in the absence of an indigenous bourgeois class, and the exigencies of capitalist development in West Pakistan. But capitalism itself could not have experienced such an unbridled growth had not an external element been introduced into Pakistan's political dynamics and into the relationship between its two parts.

The celebrated "robber barons" of West Pakistan would have faced competition, and yielded some ground to, the emerging bourgeoisie in Bengal had the rules of "free enterprise" and competitive capitalism prevailed. After all, West Pakistani entrepreneurs were not so invincible in the beginning as to be

able to impose monopolistic control over East Pakistan, despite the support they received from the all-powerful bureaucracy. The emergence of A.K. Khan, who served as a minister in Ayub Khan's first cabinet, and a few other industrialists in Bengal was an indication of the possibilities of entrepreneurship that existed in East Pakistan. But West Pakistan's capitalists were not a "national bourgeoisie" whose growth and prosperity would depend entirely on the exploitation of national resources and domestic savings. They sought collaboration with foreign capital in order to increase their fortunes and were willing to offer benefits to the imperialist powers at the expense of the people of Pakistan.

Fortunately for them, the United States, the leading money lender since World War II, was actively seeking Cold War allies and was eager to provide economic and military "assistance" to third world ruling groups willing to collaborate with her. The Pakistani rulers seized this opportunity and in 1951 began to receive economic aid -- mainly grants in the beginning -- from the U.S. By 1954, Pakistan was firmly in the orbit of the United States, having signed a mutual security treaty and joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). In 1955, it also became a member of another American pact, the Baghdad Pact (renamed later as the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO), with Iran, Turkey and Iraq as its allies. American military aid began rolling into Pakistan, amounting to \$1.5-2.0 billion by 1969.<sup>5</sup> As part of her obligation to the U.S., the Pakistan government allowed America to build a military base near Peshawar, and to use its civilian airfields for espionage flights, including the ill-fated U-2 plane which was shot down in the Soviet Union, causing a major international crisis. Pakistan's leaders repeatedly assured the U.S. of their complete allegiance. In a 1961 address to the U.S. Congress, Pakistan's then-President Ayub Khan said, "if there is real trouble, there is no country in Asia where

you will be able to put your foot in. The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan."<sup>6</sup>

Although U.S. economic aid, like its military aid, was designed to maintain "a position of influence and control around the world,"<sup>7</sup> the economic benefits to the U.S. were not unimportant. With its aid program as an entering wedge, the U.S. expanded its share of Pakistan's imports from 6% in 1952 to as much as 40% in the early sixties. Aid as an instrument of economic imperialism has been treated extensively by many scholars, including Magdoff<sup>8</sup> and Alavi.<sup>9</sup>

What we are mainly concerned with here is the effect of foreign economic and military aid on political developments in Pakistan, especially the relationship between East and West Pakistan.

#### Economic Aid

By 1969 the United States had provided \$3 billion in grants and loans -- mainly loans in the later years -- for Pakistan's economic development.<sup>10</sup> Among the many strings attached to U.S. aid was the explicit guideline to encourage "private enterprise." For this purpose US advisors under Harvard's Development Advisory Service (D.A.S.) were sent to Pakistan to influence the policies of the Planning Commission and other economic decision-making agencies.<sup>11</sup> The U.S. aid mission in Pakistan played no small role in initiating economic policies for Pakistan.<sup>12</sup> In the interest of Pakistan's robber barons, Pakistan's bureaucrats -- and later military officers as well -- followed American advice. So faithfully did the Pakistani rulers abide by the U.S. advice that one of the top advisors to Pakistan had this to say about her development.

*Policies have been framed to assure that the government intervenes in the economy when such intervention is in theory desirable, while leaving in private hands decisions which, according to theory, should be left to private initiative.*<sup>13</sup> (Emphasis added)

Pakistan's dependence on foreign economic aid was so colossal that 35% of her first Five-year plan, 50% of her second plan and 26% of the third plan was supported by external loans and grants. The lower percentage in the last plan does not indicate relative self-sufficiency; it was necessitated by strains in the Pakistan-U.S. alliance as a result of the Sino-Pakistan "friendship." Pakistan's economic success was heralded throughout the capitalist world, and Pakistan was often cited as the "show-case" of non-communist development.<sup>14</sup> According to Professor Edward Mason, foreign aid was the single most important factor in Pakistan's economic growth.<sup>15</sup>

But a model of economic development which envisaged growth through the agency of a handful of robber barons was bound to lead to contradictions and to negate the limited gains already achieved. As a result of the capitalist model followed by Pakistan, 20 families came to control 80% of the banking, 70% of the insurance and 66% of the industrial assets of Pakistan.<sup>16</sup> The gulf in income created by such accumulation of wealth, the disruption of traditional life, and the consequent alienation of the masses found their expression in the massive countrywide upsurge that lasted for five months in 1968-69 and overthrew Ayub Khan's dictatorship. The volcano was tranquilized by the imposition of martial law and the promise of free elections. But the momentum of economic growth lost in 1968 has not been regained since.<sup>17</sup>

These developments not only intensified the class struggle but aggravated already existing regional strains. The robber barons were all West Pakistani; given their preference to invest in West Pakistan, the growth of this class amounted to increased disparity between the two regions. By the end of the notorious "decade of development" (1958-68), West Pakistan's GDP exceeded that of East Pakistan by 34%, the official disparity in per capita income had become 62%, and the real difference in the average stan-

dard of living had widened to 126%.<sup>18</sup> Table 1 shows the widening economic gap between the two regions over a period of twenty years.

The manner in which foreign aid and foreign advice helped in widening this gulf may be stated simply: private enterprise, being mainly West Pakistani, preferred to invest in the more "conducive" atmosphere of West Pakistan; the public sector followed suit by heavy allocations for the economic infrastructure centered in West Pakistan; the growing power of the West Pakistani capitalists and the prevailing philosophy of economic development prevented higher taxes on the rich. Insufficient public resources meant insufficient allocation to East Pakistan -- even if it had received its due share of public resources.<sup>19</sup>

Regional disparities in allocation, and therefore in economic growth, have been given a great deal of attention by East Pakistani economists, who were the supporters of the Awami League. But in view of the fact that the private sector was almost entirely West Pakistani<sup>20</sup> and the public sector existed merely to augment the private sector, removal of disparities would have led only to the equalization of the superficial economic indicators, such as GDP and per capita income. It would not have changed the colonial nature of the economy.

#### Military Aid

From 1954 Pakistan's status as an active ally of the United States in the Cold War necessitated altering the internal balance of forces:

*From a political viewpoint, U.S. military aid has strengthened Pakistan's armed services, the greatest stabilizing force in the country, and has encouraged Pakistan to participate in collective defense agreements.<sup>21</sup>*

The U.S. military assistance converted Pakistan's army into the paramount

political force in the country -- the great defender of the propertied classes and a deterrent to a possible social revolution. In 1958 the army asserted its hegemony by staging a coup in order to prevent the scheduled general elections. The leader of the coup, General Ayub Khan, later revealed that he had consulted officials in Washington, including CIA chief Allen Dulles, before declaring martial law in Pakistan.<sup>22</sup>

In terms of the regional relations in Pakistan, the ascendancy of the military amounted to greater enslavement of East Pakistan. Military rule not only precluded any possibility of East Pakistan asserting her demographic strength in parliamentary elections, but the army's growth also led to more brutal exploitation of East Pakistan. The overgrown military establishment consumed as much as 60% of the country's revenue budget. Not only did it consume resources of both regions, but East Pakistan's foreign exchange was vital to its survival, especially after 1965 when it had to buy spare parts and new weapons in the black market. Since military headquarters were located in West Pakistan and 90% of its ranks and almost 100% of its top positions were held by West Pakistanis, East Pakistan was denied a share in the local expenditure of the military and the job opportunities it created. Above all, the military's role as the guardian of capitalism and the pulverizer of the popular will expedited the colonization of East Bengal and diminished the possibilities of peaceful change in the regional relationships.

It is evident from the above discussion that Pakistan's social structure was predisposed to creating colonial relationships between her two regions. But the possibilities of altering such relations were greatly reduced by the imperialist interference in Pakistan. While the Pakistani approach to economic development based on foreign aid and advice exacerbated the existing contradictions between the mother country and

the colony, the political power of the West Pakistani military, resulting from American military alliances, made it impossible for East Pakistan to secure its rights through parliamentary processes.

### Cultural Imperialism

No discussion of the conflict between East and West Pakistan would be complete without referring to East Bengal's national question. Although linked intimately with the colonial question, the cultural issue by itself was an important source of regional tensions.

Geographical and historical conditions produced enormous cultural differences between East and West Pakistan. Whereas the West was greatly influenced by the Middle East, with all of its written languages using modified Arabic scripts, East Pakistan was culturally homogeneous with West Bengal in India with whom it shared a long common history, a rich cultural heritage and a Sanskrit-like script. The centrifugal potential of this cultural gap was recognized right away by the ruling classes of West Pakistan who feared that religious unity alone might not be able to maintain "national unity."

True to colonial traditions, the West Pakistani rulers embarked upon a campaign of "assimilating" the Bengalis into Pakistan's "mainstream." As a result, Urdu, a language of 3.7% of Pakistanis, was imposed as the sole national language, despite Bengali protests. Bengali legislators trying to speak in their own language in the assembly were warned that they could be tried for treason. The political and economic implications of this cultural imperialism were seen clearly by the Bengali masses whose spontaneous movement in 1947-48 and again in 1952 resulted in the acceptance of Bengali as the second national language of Pakistan. But this was not accomplished without a massacre of the Bengali protesters.<sup>23</sup>

With the emergence of the West Pakistani (more accurately Punjabi) military as the paramount political force, and with the acceleration of capitalist development, the onslaught against Bengali culture and attempts at "Islamization" and "Pakistanization" also intensified. Former President Ayub Khan remarked several times that the Bengalis should be freed from the "evil influence" of the Hindu culture. He even banned the playing of Tagore's songs on Radio Pakistan because Tagore was Hindu and, therefore, an evil influence. But the Nobel prize-winning Tagore was the national poet of Bengalis, loved and admired by Hindus and Muslims alike.<sup>24</sup> The Bengali masses considered this assault against their culture a weapon in West Pakistan's colonial domination over East Pakistan.

In order to set back East Pakistan's cultural development, not only were there official attempts at "national integration," but educational progress in the region was retarded and Bengalis, who were previously more educated than the West Pakistanis, were forced into a secondary position, as can be seen in Table 2. This educational disparity was then used to rationalize lower participation of Bengalis in the civil service and the fewer scholarships awarded to Bengalis for advanced studies in foreign countries. In a survey I conducted in 1966-67, I found that barely 20% of Pakistani students enrolled in U.S. universities came from East Pakistani institutions.<sup>25</sup>

Colonial ruling classes, in order to exact the support of their own oppressed masses, not only throw them a few crumbs, but try to justify their conquest by inventing and perpetuating myths about the racial and cultural inferiority of the colonized people. The British had already left behind myths about the lethargy, cowardice and untrustworthiness of the Bengalis, to which the West Pakistani rulers added the promiscuity and semi-Hinduism of the Bengali Muslims. These stereotypes were readily accepted by a large segment of the West Pakistani intelligentsia who benefitted from dis-

crimination against Bengalis.<sup>26</sup> One of the favorite right-wing "scholars" of the ruling alliance, I.H. Qureshi, went to the extent of stating that Bengalis were a different (implying inferior) race from the West Pakistanis.

The results of this indoctrination of West Pakistanis were reflected in the vengeance, pride and venom with which West Pakistani military officers carried out the carnage in East Bengal after March 25, 1971. Particularly illuminating were the remarks of a Major Kamal who told an American construction worker, interviewed on CBS television, that after the West Pakistanis had conquered East Bengal, each of his soldiers would have a Bengali mistress and that no dogs and Bengalis would be allowed in the exclusive Chittagong Club. As a member of the West Pakistani "educated class" I can testify that this is by no means an isolated case. Anti-Bengali and anti-Hindu bigotry is rampant in West Pakistan and it has now been adopted as the official doctrine of the regime.

### Political Response

The colonial relationship between East and West Pakistan overshadowed the class struggle and united virtually all classes of Bengali society against West Pakistani domination. The urban petty-bourgeoisie, because of its commercial, industrial and bureaucratic aspirations in addition to its self-image as the preserver of Bengali culture, was in the forefront of the struggle.

The first manifestation of Bengali resistance appeared in the form of the language movements of 1947-48 and 1952. But the growing political strength of the petty-bourgeoisie was demonstrated most clearly in the 1954 regional elections when the petty-bourgeois United Front, with the Awami League as its major component, gave a crushing defeat to the Muslim League, the party of the West Pakistani landlords, commercial bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy, represented in East Pakistan by the dying Muslim aristocracy. The United Front program



essentially envisaged a bourgeois democratic revolution in East Pakistan and reflected the hope of the petty-bourgeoisie for a peaceful sharing of the cake with West Pakistani capitalism. By that time, West Pakistani capitalism had not exerted its monopolistic power. East Pakistan still had a slight edge in GDP over West Pakistan. Bengali nationalism had not grown as intense as it did afterwards, and class issues were still very much alive. The Communist Party, campaigning on the basis of class issues, won four of the ten seats it contested. Twenty-two other members of the party and several sympathizers were elected to the assembly on the ticket of the Awami League or as independents.

But 1954 was the decisive year in which Pakistan's ruling classes threw in their lot unequivocally with the United States by joining Cold War pacts. The stage was set for the development of West Pakistani monopolies with a tripling of foreign economic aid and for the conversion of the military into the paramount political force through massive military assistance from the United States. The election results in East Pakistan provided a serious warning to the West Pakistani rulers. The latter quickly rendered the Bengali challenge ineffective by paralyzing the parliamentary process with the dismissal of ministries and dissolution of the parliament, and by the co-optation of selected leaders of the United Front into the central government. The Communist Party was declared illegal in 1954.

With the old aristocracy completely routed and the opportunism of the Bengali petty-bourgeois leadership exposed, there was a growing frustration among the masses and a serious split within the ranks of the petty-bourgeoisie. Not only was the United Front dismembered but a large faction of the Awami League, with its component of Communists, left the party to merge with several nationalist groups in West Pakistan and a tiny left-liberal organization, the Ganatantri Dal, in East Pakistan, forming the National Awami Party (NAP) in 1957. Besides advocating many bourgeois democratic reforms in both parts

of the country, the NAP became the only party to demand Pakistan's withdrawal from SEATO and the Baghdad Pact and pursuance of a non-aligned foreign policy. The growing influence of the NAP threatened the interests of the United States and its West Pakistani collaborators. But before elections could be held in 1958, the military led by General Ayub Khan staged a coup, abrogated the constitution and banned all political parties.

The subsequent "decade of development" was a period of unbridled growth of the West Pakistani monopoly capitalists. The Bengalis not only faced more brutal exploitation, but were deprived of the forum for airing their grievances, the parliament. The Khan regime did not even consider it necessary to co-opt members of the Bengali petty-bourgeoisie in order to provide an appearance of Bengali representation.

With the intensification of economic exploitation and political repression, the Bengali nationalism also grew more virulent, clouding the class issues and leading towards a generalized hatred of West Pakistanis. The Bengali left, represented by the NAP, partly because of its insistence on nationwide social justice and partly due to its cooperation with the regime on account of its "friendship" with China, alienated itself from the national movement. The NAP was a national party which was concerned not only with the regional grievances of East Pakistan but which sought to end the imperialist grip over Pakistan as a whole. But political consciousness in East Bengal was essentially Bengali nationalist. Any support for the government was, therefore, viewed by Bengalis as collaboration with the enemy. Under Chinese influence, the NAP went beyond according a principled support for the regime's "anti-imperialist" policies; it shied away from confronting the West Pakistani ruling structure on all substantive issues.

The Awami League (AL), with its six-point program of regional autonomy,<sup>27</sup> became the unchallenged standard-bearer

of the Bengali movement. The AL program was essentially a bill of rights for the Bengali petty-bourgeoisie, but by demanding the right of negotiating foreign aid and trade for the province, it threatened the vested interests of the West Pakistani military and bourgeoisie. Its program of abolishing the central civil service and replacing it with proportional representation from the provinces ran counter to the interests of the West Pakistani bureaucracy. The Ayub regime responded to that program by jailing several members of the AL and indicting its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, for treason.

But in 1968-69, before a judgement against Mujib could be handed down, both parts of Pakistan were shaken by a massive popular upsurge against the regime. The charges against Mujib were dropped, most of the political prisoners were freed, Ayub Khan resigned, and the new military ruler, General Yahya Khan, declared martial law, with a promise of future elections.<sup>28</sup>

General Yahya Khan fulfilled his promise by holding elections in December 1970 -- the first direct countrywide elections in Pakistan's history. The Awami League, campaigning on the platform of its six-point program of regional autonomy, was expected to emerge as the largest single party in the new assembly. But no one expected this regional party to win a simple majority nationwide. A devastating cyclone and tidal wave -- this century's worst natural disaster -- hit the coastal areas of East Pakistan three weeks before the elections, leaving approximately half a million people dead and another three million marooned. The military government's callous inefficiency in providing relief to the affected people inflamed Bengali passions and dashed the prospects of the political parties which did not support the demand for autonomy. Maulana Bhashani, the octogenarian peasant leader and the President of the NAP, demanded independence for East Pakistan and boycotted the elections. A combination of these factors gave the AL 160 out of 162 contested National Assembly seats in East Pakistan -- a clear majority nation-

wide in a house of 300 members. The way was now open for the AL to frame a new constitution on the basis of its six-point program.

But, as the world knows today, the AL was never allowed to frame a constitution or to form a government. Instead East Bengal has become a theater of the most gruesome drama of death and destruction since Auschwitz. This catastrophic end of Pakistan's honeymoon with democracy can only be explained in terms of the colonial relations between East and West Pakistan and the semi-Fascist character of the West Pakistani military,

On the basis of the analysis of the Awami League's class character and political program, I had asserted earlier that the AL sought the limited objective of controlling East Pakistan's resources but in order to develop itself into an industrial capitalist class, the Bengali petty-bourgeoisie needed the cooperation of West Pakistani and foreign capital.<sup>29</sup> By implication I suggested that independence was not on the AL's agenda since given the peculiar class structure of East Pakistan, independence could lead to a rapid collapse of the nascent bourgeois political power and pave the way for a possible popular revolution whose objective would be socialism.

There is evidence that the Awami League had contemplated a compromise with the West Pakistani power structure.<sup>30</sup> But the absolute majority won by the AL in the assembly, the increasingly unpromising mood of the Bengali masses<sup>31</sup> and the fear that Bhashani's demand for independence might destroy the credibility of the AL made it almost impossible for Sheikh Mujib to give in to the West Pakistani rulers during the constitution talks. The West Pakistani bourgeois politicians probably understood the dilemma of the AL and continued to support it despite its insistence on including all of the six points in the constitution. It is not unusual in Pakistani politics to go back on election promises. Probably the West Pakistani capitalists had reason to believe that partnership with the AL

would be possible even if the constitution were drafted on the basis of the six points.

The military, however, believed it would be impossible to perpetuate West Pakistani dominance and win other concessions from the Awami League once the constitution incorporated the six points. Even if the Awami League compromised with the military after assuming the governmental responsibilities, there was no guarantee that the NAP or a future leadership of the AL would not demand implementation of East Pakistan's constitutional rights. Clearly the Awami League's policy of seeking a detente with India, basically through the provincial control of foreign trade, militated against the military's raison d'etre.<sup>33</sup> The military had two possibilities of sabotaging an unfavorable constitution: to nullify the elections or to refuse to validate the constitution after it had been passed by the AL-dominated assembly. In view of the popular sentiment for return to parliamentary politics, both of these alternatives were somewhat risky.

The military refused to convene the assembly before the AL had yielded to it in the extra-parliamentary talks initiated by Yahya Khan between himself, Mujib and the Pakistan People's Party chief, Ali Bhutto. But Yahya's blatant support for Bhutto's announced boycott of the session scheduled for March 3, his indefinite postponement of the assembly session without consultation with Mujib and his highly provocative speech of March 6, made it evident that the military was not prepared for a "business-like" deal. It wanted an outright surrender from the Awami League. The non-cooperation movement in East Bengal, started in response to the military's arbitrary actions, convinced the semi-Fascist hardcore in the junta that brute force, which had previously been used in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province, was the only answer to Bengali nationalism. The dismissal of East Pakistan's moderate

Governor, Admiral Ahsan, the appointment of the notorious General Tikka Khan as the new Governor, and the dissolution of the semi-civilian central cabinet were the signals warning of the impending military onslaught. Only the logistical problem of transporting troops from West Pakistan via the over-water route around Ceylon had to be solved. In a tactical move General Yahya flew to Dacca for talks with the AL leaders in which he appeared very conciliatory. As soon as the troop build-up was completed, with approximately 50,000 West Pakistani soldiers in East Bengal, General Yahya left for West Pakistan and a reign of terror was unleashed on the people of East Bengal.

Interestingly enough, in his March 26 speech, the General made no mention of any Awami League conspiracy to separate East Pakistan from the union; instead, he used the AL's alleged proposal of calling separate sessions of East and West Pakistani legislators and the non-cooperation movement as the signs of the AL's intention to "breakaway completely from the country."<sup>34</sup> The Prime Minister of the "Provisional Government of Bangladesh," Tajuddin Ahmed, later stated that the proposal for the separate sessions was Yahya's own and that "at no stage was there any breakdown of talks or any indication by General Yahya or his team that they had a final position which could not be abandoned."<sup>35</sup> Indeed, it took six weeks for the military to fabricate charges and to issue its "official expose" of the Awami League's "secessionist plot."

*All evidence goes to show that the small hours of March 26 had been set as the zero hour for an armed uprising, and the formal launching of 'the independent Republic of Bangladesh.' The plan was to seize Dacca and Chittagong, lying astride the army's air/sea lifelines to West Pakistan.....the Armed forces made a series of pre-emptive strikes around midnight of March 25-26, seized the initiative and saved the country.<sup>36</sup>*

If there was indeed a plot for secession, it is a very poor reflection on the American-trained Pakistani intelligence corps to have discovered it six weeks after the fact, or on the celebrated "Information" Ministry to have revealed it that late. But the "evidence" the military government is referring to has been presented nowhere.

Simultaneous with the crackdown against the Bengali autonomy movement, the army launched repression in West Pakistan, where a number of leftist politicians and working class leaders were thrown into jail.<sup>37</sup> The army then announced the decision to appoint legislators to frame the constitution, to disallow regional political parties, and to continue martial law even after the formal transfer of government to civilians.<sup>38</sup> These developments were consistent with the army's role in 1958 and 1969 in sabotaging the possibilities of freeing Pakistan from the imperialist noose and of bringing radical social changes within the country.

### The Struggle Ahead

The Pakistan army's decision to seek a "final solution" of the "Bengal problem" by a genocidal attack, besides resulting in the massacre of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, the burning and strafing of thousands of towns and villages and the exodus of millions of refugees, has qualitatively changed the nature of the struggle in Bangladesh and has generated new possibilities and dangers throughout South Asia.

For the struggle in East Bengal itself, the military operation proved the futility of the parliamentary politics of the petty-bourgeois Awami League and vindicated the left groups which had demanded independence or resorted to guerrilla training instead of participating in the elections. The dream of achieving regional autonomy within the union of Pakistan died with the first blast of canons on the night of March 25, 1971. Instead, an armed national liberation struggle was born.

The military's offensive has already liquidated or put out of action a number of important Awami League leaders. Others, at the first sight of mortar fire fled across the border to form the so-called "Provisional Government" in the safe haven of West Bengal. From the published reports, messages received from our colleagues on the scene and interviews with Bengalis who have returned from West Bengal, it appears that the "Provisional Government" is firmly in the grip of the Indian government, which has prevented the AL from including any leftists in it, and which has carefully scrutinized the guerrillas training on Indian soil. Besides having nominal ties with the Mukti Fouj or Mukti Bahini [Liberation Army], consisting of the Bengali elements of the former East Pakistan Rifles and Bengal Regiment, the Provisional Government is mainly occupied with obtaining international recognition, appealing to the humanitarianism of the people of the world and co-sponsoring conferences on genocide with Western liberal organizations.

As the struggle intensifies, there is no doubt that the legitimacy of the Awami League will be progressively eroded. The legitimacy gained as a result of an election victory will no longer be relevant. The new legitimacy will have to be gained in the battlefield and it is here that the Awami League has been weakest.

### The Left Groups

The inability of the petty-bourgeois Awami League to lead armed struggle for independence is readily recognized by most observers of the Pakistani scene. Given the class make-up of East Bengalis society, a tradition of working class militancy, and the change in the nature of struggle since March 25, if the independence of Bangladesh does not come about quickly as a result of the economic collapse of West Pakistan or Indo-Pakistan war or big power pressure, it seems likely that the leadership of the movement will pass to the revolutionary left.

Before considering the possibility of the transformation of the Bengali nationalist movement into a genuine revolutionary national liberation struggle, it is useful to glance at the state of the left in East Bengal. After the banning of the Communist Party in 1954, party workers either operated underground or inside the Awami League and the small left-liberal Ganatantri Dal. In 1957, the leftist faction of the Awami League, with its component of communists, left the party in protest against its pro-Western foreign policy. It then merged with the Ganatantri Dal and various nationalist parties in West Pakistan to form the National Awami Party (NAP) under the leadership of the Bengali peasant leader, Maulana Bhashani. Little is known about the underground activities of the Communist Party. However, many communists were active in the trade unions, the *Krishnik Samity* [peasants' committee], the East Pakistan Students' Union, various cultural bodies and other mass organizations.

Differences appeared among the communists over the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, the Sino-Indian border clash of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. By the beginning of 1968, both the underground party and the NAP had split into "pro-Moscow" and "pro-Peking" factions. The "pro-Moscow" wing of the NAP was led by Wali Khan, a Pathan leader, on the national level and by Prof. Muzaffar Ahmed, a long time communist, in East Pakistan. Maulana Bhashani became the national leader of the "pro-Peking" wing of the NAP. The underground organization of the "pro-Moscow" communists was headed by Moni Singh, a veteran of peasant revolts of the 1940's. Whereas the policies of the "pro-Moscow" communists remained consistent with the declaration of the 1960 Moscow conference of 81 communist parties,<sup>39</sup> the so-called "pro-Peking" group, despite its revolutionary rhetoric, failed to offer a coherent alternative program.

The esteem and organization of the "pro-Peking" leftists were seriously damaged by their reluctance to oppose the dictatorial regime of Ayub Khan

and to clearly support the demand for East Pakistan's autonomy. Maulana Bhashani's idiosyncracies had alienated many radical members of the NAP and the Krishik Samity. The country-wide mass spontaneous upsurge in 1968-69 brought the conflicts among the pro-Peking leftists into the open. Those advocating the formation of a genuine working class party separated themselves from the NAP and split into at least three major factions in 1970. The Pabna-based Matin-Allaudin group called itself the Purbo Bangla Communist Party; the Toha-Abdul Huq group, based mainly in Jessore and Noakhali, presented itself as the East Pakistani counterpart of the West Bengali Naxalites and assumed the name of East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist); and two former student leaders, Kazi Zafar Ahmed and Rashid Khan Menon, formed the Communist Revolutionaries' East Bengal Co-ordinating Committee (C.R.E.B.C.C.). All of them opposed participation in the elections. The E.P.C.P. (M-L) even rejected mass and class organizations and concentrated on organizing guerrilla actions against class enemies in the countryside.<sup>40</sup> Those staying with Bhashani did so mainly because of their interest in the elections. Thus when Bhashani withdrew his party from the elections and demanded independence for East Pakistan in the wake of the devastating cyclone of November 1970, a large number of party leaders, including Haji Danesh and Anwar Zahid, left the NAP.<sup>41</sup>

The "pro-Peking" left was in a state of complete disarray when the military launched its offensive against the Bengali people in March 1971. As a result of the military action, tactical differences in the left began to disappear, and it was expected that the left would once again forge its unity on the basis of a program for armed national liberation. However, personal differences among the leaders led to the further fragmentation of the existing factions. Bhashani, despite his age (89), managed to escape to India and urged the world leaders to recognize the Provisional Government set up by the Awami League leaders.<sup>42</sup> He also met with the leaders of all "Maoist" factions,

except the E.P.C.P.(M-L), on April 25 to press for the formation of a National Liberation Front.<sup>43</sup> On June 1 these groups announced the formation of the "Bangladesh National Liberation Struggle Co-ordination Committee," urged the formation of a national liberation front of all parties, including the Awami League, and issued a declaration which called for the establishment of an "anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and anti-monopoly" social system in Bangladesh.<sup>44</sup>

Pro-Moscow leaders, Muzaffar Ahmed and Moni Singh--the latter having escaped from the Rajshahi prison--endorsed the Awami League's Provisional Government and extended their cooperation to the League and the Mukti Bahini (Awami League-affiliated liberation army)., without publicly calling for the formation of a national liberation front.

The E.P.C.P.(M-L), unlike the other "Maoists" and the pro-Moscow communists, termed the struggle in East Bengal a conflict between the West Pakistani monopoly capitalists and the East Pakistani nascent bourgeoisie. They remained inside East Bengal and refused to have any contact with the Awami League and the Indian government. Their attitude was interpreted by their critics as Peking-directed opposition to the independence movement. Many non-Communist reporters have carried stories concerning E.P.C.P.'s encounters with the Pakistan Army and cooperation with Mukti Bahini at the local level.<sup>45</sup> But Prof. Muzaffar Ahmed insists that the party does not support independence and that their actions consist only of killing landlords and distributing land to the peasants.<sup>46</sup>

The organizational strength of the E.P.C.P.(M-L) and the support it is capable of drawing from its Naxalite comrades across the border have worried the Indian government, the AL and the pro-Moscow communists. The Indian government fears a radical Marxist, especially Maoist, Bangladesh on its borders. The Indian leaders have made it clear in their pronouncements that they want an Awami League-led government

installed in Bangladesh. Such a government will be similar to their own in terms of its class character and ideology. The AL hopes for a quick victory--preferably the result of an Indo-Pakistan war--to establish its rule before it has lost its legitimacy. The pro-Moscow communists, who are quite adept at forming united fronts with bourgeois parties, would prefer a route to independence which ensured increased Indian and Awami League dependence on the Soviet Union.

The signing of the 20-year Friendship Treaty between India and the Soviet Union, which was necessitated, among other things, by the continuing U.S. and Chinese support for Pakistan, represents a significant victory for Soviet strategy in the region. Soon after the signing of the treaty, the Awami League, under pressure from New Delhi, agreed to the formation of a five-party Consultative Committee of Bangladesh Struggle. This committee, which is expected to be the precursor of a united front, gives pro-Moscow communists representation out of proportion to their strength. It includes one member each from the pro-Moscow Bangladesh Communist Party and its front organization, the NAP (Muzaffar). Maulana Bhashani has been included in it in an individual capacity because of his enormous popularity and for creating a facade of all-party representation. The Hindu Bangladesh National Congress, which had submerged itself in the AL, also has one representative. The Awami League has four members. All members of the committee have accepted the all-Awami League Provisional Government as the sole legitimate authority in Bangladesh. All "Maoist" groups, which had originally called for the formation of a national liberation front, have been excluded from the Consultative Committee.

The strategy of the pro-Moscow communists seems to be consistent with their policy of achieving "independent national democracy" as the first stage of the two-stage socialist revolution. The independence of Bangladesh is supposed to accomplish only the first stage in this process of transition. One of the

two main ingredients of this line, as applied to the present situation, is the acceptance of the hegemony of the Awami League, as discussed earlier. The other important ingredient is the pursuance of a military strategy which does not entail radicalization of the masses. Both the Awami League and the pro-Moscow left consider self-sustained and protracted guerrilla warfare inimical to their interests since such strategy will not only postpone the independence of Bangladesh but will require intense ideological education of the masses and create conditions favorable to the more radical "Maoist" groups. A slight prolongation of the struggle, however, will enable the pro-Moscow left to take advantage of the inertia of the Awami League leadership, consolidate its influence in the Mukti Bahini and among the Awami League political cadres, and acquire greater leverage within the coalition. The gains thus made will presumably place the pro-Moscow communists in a favorable position to carry independent Bangladesh toward the path of independent national democracy and eventually toward socialism.

The military strategy employed by the Awami League and the pro-Moscow left at this stage has consisted mainly of the Mukti Bahini commandos and leftist guerrillas disrupting the communications and power supply in the interior and the Mukti Bahini regulars, operating from sanctuaries in India, making incursions along the border and trying to hold a few liberated areas. It is quite obvious that the Bangladesh coalition does not envisage Mukti Bahini alone defeating the Pakistani army. It will require lengthy training and costly equipment for the Mukti Bahini regulars to become a match for the 80,000-strong well-trained and well-equipped occupation army of Pakistan. The Bangladesh strategy, therefore, implies involvement of Indian troops against the Pakistani army at some point. The chances of Indian intervention grow in direct proportion to the erosion of the Awami League's legitimacy and the radicalization of the liberation movement. Unless the Bangladesh crisis is solved

quickly, the chances of having a friendly petty-bourgeois regime in East Bengal will be greatly reduced. International support for India's actions can come mainly from the Soviet-bloc countries. Acceptance of pro-Moscow communists in the Bangladesh coalition is, therefore, a small price to pay for Soviet material and moral support in a venture designed to protect the class interests of the Indian rulers.

For the success of Soviet strategy in South Asia--which includes domination of the Indian Ocean and containment of Chinese influence, it is more important to have friendly and dependent--preferably petty-bourgeois-communist coalition--governments than equality and freedom for the peoples of the region. Ceylon, where the pro-Moscow communists have formed a coalition government with the petty-bourgeois Sri Lanka Freedom Party, is the archetype of the kinds of governments the Soviets would like to have in Bangladesh and India. Such a development would constitute a major breakthrough for the Soviet policy of establishing a regional security alliance against China, first propounded in June 1969.

The growing Soviet influence in South Asia makes it imperative for the United States to not only attempt a neutralization of India, Ceylon and Bangladesh, but to strengthen its stranglehold in West Pakistan. This leaves China limited alternatives in the region. It is difficult for China to support the independence of Bangladesh, since such independence is likely to strengthen the Indo-Soviet front against her. On the other hand, despite friendly state relations between Pakistan and China, the West Pakistani ruling oligarchy is unmistakably fascist and pro-imperialist. China's denunciations of India notwithstanding, she is not expected to involve herself militarily on Pakistan's side. Unlike 1965 when the Chinese diverted India from launching a major assault against Pakistan, today China feels seriously threatened by possible Soviet moves against her territory and her nuclear installations.

The dilemma of China is reflected in the dilemma of the Bangladesh "Maoists." The objective conditions in Bangladesh offer an opportunity of carrying out a protracted people's war which would radicalize the masses and allow the development of revolutionary infrastructures during the course of struggle. But such developments are contrary to the interests of the East Bengali petty-bourgeoisie, the Indian ruling classes and the Soviet Union. The "Maoists" know that if independence comes quickly as a result of Indo-Soviet pressure, it will substitute new exploiters for the old. But at the same time they cannot sit idly by and watch their country being ravaged, their people being slaughtered and their women being raped by the fascist hordes from West Pakistan.

Whether or not the Chinese openly support the "Maoist" insurrectionists in Bangladesh, the E.P.C.P.(M-L) and other "Maoists" are likely to continue building bases, training guerrillas, forming administrative infrastructures in the villages and eliminating class enemies. The AL-pro-Moscow coalition, which has now excluded the "Maoists," will have to face the reality of their presence. If an accommodation is not brought about soon enough, an independent Bangladesh will most likely be ripe for a civil war of its own in which Soviet and Indian arms, supplied to the AL-pro-Moscow coalition, may be used against the "Maoist" peasants demanding radical restructuring of the society in place of the Awami League's parliamentary democracy and the pro-Moscow communists' "independent national democracy."

#### FOOTNOTES

Editor's note: This article was completed prior to the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war.

1. The most authentic report of the genocide is to be found in the account of a West Pakistani journalist, Anthony Mascarenhas: "Genocide: Why the Refugees Fled," Sunday Times, June 13, 1971; for a reliable account of the conditions

of the refugees, see Congressman Gallagher's testimony in Congressional Record June 11, 1971.

2. See Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Pantheon, New York, 1968, Vol. I, p.234-244; and Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power?, William Morrow & Co., New York, 1970, pp. 25-36.

3. For a discussion of the military and the bureaucracy as semi-autonomous social forces, see Hamza Alavi, "Army and Bureaucracy in Pakistan," International Socialist Journal, March-April, 1966.

4. Since the launching of the military operation in East Bengal, the Government of Pakistan has engaged in a wild propaganda war which attempts to disprove the widely accepted facts about the economic exploitation of East Bengal. As part of this propaganda, the Government controlled news agency, PPI, released an item which was printed in all the Pakistani papers on June 14, 1971 and circulated by Pakistani missions abroad. It read in part as follows "The latest figures of trade between East and West Pakistan disprove the myth West Pakistan has turned East Pakistan into a market for its industrial products." Even if the figures used for this story are taken at face value, the surplus of East Pakistan's export of manufactures over that of the West Pakistan amounts to only Rs. 100,000 for the year 1969-70, whereas the overall surplus of West Pakistani exports comes to Rs. 740 million. Two additional facts regarding inter-regional trade need to be taken into account: (1) East Pakistan's largest item of export to West Pakistan, i.e. tea, is counted as a manufactured good and (2) most of the industry and plantations in East Pakistan are owned by West Pakistanis and foreigners anyway. No amount of statistical juggling can change the facts about colonialism.

5. Figures cited in Mason, Dorfman and Marglin, "Conflict in East Pakistan Background and Prospects," Congressional Record, April 7, 1971.

6. This well-known statement has been quoted widely, including in the U.S. government's manual for military personnel: Area Handbook For Pakistan, DA Pam No. 550-48, Washington, D.C.:



Superintendent of Documents, October 1965, p. 339.

7. America's late President Kennedy, quoted by Harry Magdoff in The Age of Imperialism, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969, p. 117.

8. Magdoff, op. cit.

9. Hamza Alavi, "Pakistan: the Burden of U.S. Aid," in Imperialism and Underdevelopment, edited by Robert I. Rhodes, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1970.

10. M.A. Sattar, United States Aid and Pakistan's Economic Development, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tufts University, 1969.

11. For a discussion of the role of Harvard's Development Advisory Service in Pakistan, see "Underdeveloping the World," a pamphlet prepared by students and movement research people in Cambridge, Mass.; reprinted in Forum (Dacca), September 26, 1970.

12. Hamza Alavi, "Pakistan: the Burden of U.S. Aid," op. cit.

13. Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967, p. 226.

14. Among the numerous favorable reports and commentaries about Pakistan's economic development, one needs special mention, i.e. the World Bank-sponsored Pearson Report: Lester B. Pearson, Partners in Development, Praeger, New York, 1969.

15. Edward S. Mason, Economic Development in India and Pakistan, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, no. 13, September 1966. M.A. Sattar's recent study showed that Pakistan's economic growth rate would have been much slower without U.S. aid.

16. This widely quoted revelation by Pakistan's Chief Economist, Mahbub-ul Haq, appears in a number of places, including "Underdeveloping the World," op. cit.

17. For a discussion of the consequences of Pakistan's model of economic development, see Arthur MacEwan, "Contradictions in Capitalist Development: the Case of Pakistan," paper read at the Conference on Economic Growth and Distributive Justice in Pakistan, University of Rochester, July 29-31, 1970; abstract published in Pakistan Forum, October-November 1970.

18. A.R. Khan, "A New Look at Disparity," Forum, January 3, 1970.

19. A confidential report on regional disparities singled out the policies of the central government as the most important cause of the widening gap between the two regions: Government of East Pakistan-Planning Department, Economic Disparities between East and West Pakistan, Officer on Special Duty, S. & G.A. Department, In-charge, East Pakistan Government Press, Dacca, 1963, p. 15. For more recent discussion of the governmental policies, see several articles by Rahman Sobhan in Forum: "Fourth Plan Fiasco," February 14, 1970; "Doing Justice in the Fourth Plan," June 6, 1970; "Forced Five Year Plan," June 13, 1970; and "Budget from the Past," July 11, 1970; also, a number of unsigned articles in Forum: "Fourth Plan Maneuvers," November 29, 1969; "Finance Committee: Accused as the Judge," May 23, 1970; "Budget Anti-Climax," July 4, 1970; and "Past Panels and Committees: An Appraisal," September 5, 1970.

20. Papanek, op. cit.

21. Department of State and Department of Defense, The Mutual Security Program Fiscal Year 1958, Washington D.C., 1962, Vol. I, p. 359.

22. M. Ayub Khan, Friends, Not Masters, Oxford University Press, New York, 1967, p. 59.

23. An authoritative account of the language movement appears in Badruddin Umar, The Language Movement in East Bengal and its Contemporary Politics, [in Bengali], published in November 1970; English serialization of the book was terminated by the events of February-March 1971 in East Pakistan. The first installment appeared in Forum of February 20, 1971.

24. After declaring their independence, the people of East Bengal adopted one of Tagore's songs as their national anthem.

25. Pakistan Student, May-June 1967.

26. The recent massacre, flight and purging of Bengali intelligentsia have opened up many job opportunities for unemployed West Pakistanis and promotions for others. If the attitude of the West Pakistani employees of the Pakistan Embassy in Washington is any indicator of the mood of the West Pakistani educated segment, the Bengal carnage has been greeted as a blessing in that region.

27. These points are: 1) a federal and parliamentary form of government, with

supremacy of the legislature, based on direct adult franchise and proportional representation, 2) the federal government to have responsibilities of defense and foreign policy only, 3) separate currencies or other alternate means of preventing the transfer of resources from one region to the other, 4) fiscal policy and power of taxation to be in the hands of the regional governments, 5) regional governments to control their foreign exchange earnings and to have the power of negotiating foreign aid and trade and 6) para-military forces to be provided to the regions. For details, see A.H.M. Kamruzzaman, Manifesto of All Pakistan Awami League, Dacca, June 1970.

28. For a graphic account of the events of 1968-69, see Tariq Ali, op. cit., chapters V, VI, and VII.

29. Feroz Ahmed, "Veillee d'Armes Electorale au Pakistan," Africasia, November 9, 1970.

30. Feroz Ahmed, "The Struggle in West Pakistan," manuscript prepared for a forthcoming book to be published under the sponsorship of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars; see also, General Yahya Khan's statement of June 28, 1971, Pakistan Affairs, June 30, 1971.

31. Rashed Akhtar, "From Non-cooperation to the People's Raj," Forum, March 13, 1971.

32. The West Pakistani right-wing parties not only insisted that the Awami League be allowed to frame a constitution on the basis of the six points but supported the AL's four supplementary demands which included the transfer of the interim government to the elected representatives, Pakistan Times, March 14, 1971.

33. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's nationwide television speech, Dawn, October 29, 1970.

34. Pakistan Affairs, March 31, 1971.

35. Tajuddin Ahmed's statement of April 17, 1971, mimeo, distributed by the Mission of Bangladesh in Calcutta.

36. Pakistan [Affairs], May 11, 1971.

37. Pakistan Forum, June-July, 1971.

38. Yahya Khan's June 28 speech.

39. For the pro-Moscow position, see, "Leninism is our Guide," World Marxist Review, May, 1970.

40. For a critical analysis of the splits in the East Bengali left, see the

three part article by A.H. Khan in Forum (Dacca), December 19 and 26, 1970 and January 2, 1971.

41. Most of these leaders have now refused to support independence and have joined hands with West Pakistan-based parties.

42. "Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashan Appeal to World Leaders," published by the Provisional Government of Bangladesh.

43. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 15, 1971.

44. Sphulinga: Bulletin of the Bangladesh Association of Quebec, Vol. I, No. 9.

45. Far Eastern Economic Review, April 4, 1971, and Economist, July 10, 1971.

46. Interview with the author, Pakistan Forum, October, 1971.

Table 1  
Gross Domestic Product in 1959-60 Constant Prices  
(in million rupees)

	East	West
1949-50	13,130	11,830
1954-55	14,320	14,310
1959-60	15,550	16,790
1964-65	18,014	21,788
1968-69	20,670	27,744

Sources: Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 317; and A.R. Khan, "A New Look at Disparity," Forum, January 3, 1970.




Table 2  
Educational Disparities

	East Pakistan		West Pakistan	
	1947	1967	1947	1967
<b>Primary level</b>				
Number of insts.	29,633	28,225	8,413	33,271
Number of students	2,020,000	4,310,000	550,000	2,740,000
<b>Secondary level</b>				
Institutions	3,481	4,390	2,598	4,563
Students	53,000	107,000	51,000	153,000
<b>General College</b>				
Institutions	50	173	40	239
Enrollment	19,000	138,000	13,000	142,000
<b>General University</b>				
Institutions	1	2	2	4
Enrollment	1,600	8,000	700	10,000

Source: Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, Education Statistics of Pakistan (1947-57); and A.O. Huque, "Educational Disparities in Pakistan," Forum, December 20, 1969.

Table 3  
Some Economic Indicators

	<u>East Pakistan</u>	<u>West Pakistan</u>
Area (in square miles)	54,501	310,236
Population, (1970 estimate)	70 million	60 million
Five-year plan allocations		
1st	32%	68%
2nd	32%	68%
3rd	36%	64%
4th (unlikely to be implemented)	52.5%	47.5%
Foreign aid allocation	20-30%	70-80%
Export earning	50-70%	30-50%
Import expenditure	25-30%	70-75%
Industrial assets owned by Bengalis		11%
Civil service jobs	16-20%	80-84%
Military jobs	10%	90%
Resources transferred from East to West between 1948-49 and 1968-69		Rs.31,120 million*
Per capita income, official		
1964-65	Rs.285.5	Rs.419.0
1968-69	Rs.291.5	Rs.473.4
Regional difference in p.c.i., official		
1959-60		32%
1964-65		47%
1968-69		62%
Real difference in p.c.i., 1968-69		95%

Real difference in average standard

of living, 1968-69

126%

Proportion of income spent on food by

industrial workers (1955-56 survey)

69-75%

60-63%

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\*At the official rate, U.S. \$1 = 4.76 rupees (Rs.); current market exchange rate, \$1 = Rs.11.

Sources: Pakistan Statistical Yearbooks and Pakistan Economic Survey for the various years, Government of East Pakistan (1963), Papanek (1967), A.R. Khan (1970), Interim Reports (May 1970) and Forum (Feb. 27, 1971).

Table 4

Inter-regional trade (exports)

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Year	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
(in millions of rupees)		
1948-49	18.8	137.6
1950-51	46.0	210.8
1955-56	220.7	318.9
1960-61	355.9	800.5
1965-66	649.7	1,189.8
1969-70	915.7	1,656.2

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Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey 1967-68 and Pakistan Times, June 14, 1971.