Scott Lucas

Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin

The frameworks to avoid war have been smashed, leading to instability for some time to come.

With the US-Israel assault on Iran expanding to encompass all of the Persian Gulf states and Lebanon, a kaleidoscope has been turned.

Regional pieces are tumbling with no centre of power. We can no longer speak of American “leadership”. With no apparent "plan B" after the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and a host of other commanders and officials, the US national security establishment no longer knows who it is supposed to be negotiating with.

And the messages it is getting from the US commander in chief, Donald Trump, simply add to the confusion. For much of the time, these messages contrast wildly with those of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. For some of the time, what Trump says contrasts dramatically with what he said just hours before.

The first result of this is that the Gulf States are likely to conclude they cannot count on security from their relationships with Washington, even as some of them are reportedly pressing for US ground troops on Iranian territory.

There is no stability in energy markets – and no sign stability is going to be restored anytime soon, as the Trump camp considers ceding effective control of the Strait of Hormuz, at least for now, to Iran, while continuing airstrikes and blustering about “obliteration”.

We certainly cannot speak of stability when Israel’s government, already in indefinite possession of 53% of Gaza, uses this war to expand its incursion into southern Lebanon. This is in direct contravention of a UN resolution passed in 2006 and directly designed to keep the peace.

Iraq, meanwhile, will face the collapse of a fragile arrangement where Iran-backed militias were integrated into the armed forces.

Uncertainty in Yemen will be compounded as the Iran-backed Ansar Allah (Houthi rebels) join the strife.

Syria, under the Sharaa government after the fall of the Assad regime, will try to insulate itself even as Israel extends its hold on territory in the south.

Europe has little leverage and is desperately trying to avoid getting drawn into the chaos.

Russia, while assisting Iran with drones, has its hands full with its struggling invasion of Ukraine.

China will keep its head down amid the turmoil.

For decades, any “peace” in Iran and the Middle East has been fragile, maybe illusory. But now the frameworks to avoid war have been smashed.

The Trump administration’s transactional approach has culminated in a war where everyone loses. The Netanyahu government is pursuing a “greater Israel”, but, even as the expanded territory is established, it will always be under threat.

The Gulf states’ wealth of oil and gas is no longer secure and their reputation for stability is shot to pieces.

And Iran, where thousands of civilians were cut down in mass protests during January by its leaders, will still have its regime. It is weakened and damaged, but Tehran will still able to proclaim its defiant “victory” against the US and Israeli aggressors.

It's hard to find anything positive emerging from this war right now. Just over a decade after the 2015 agreement between Tehran and the 5+1 powers (US, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany) had seemingly resolved the issue of Iran's nuclear program, the most that appears possible is “de-escalation”. And even that is more mantra than reality right now.

View Scotts's profile

Andrew Thomas

Lecturer in Middle East Studies at Deakin University

The war will only make Iran stronger and more resilient in the long term.

Iran is likely to be in a stronger geopolitical position after the war than before.

It is becoming more likely by the day that the Islamic Republic will survive the continued United States and Israeli bombardment of the country, despite the strikes leaving much of its political and military leadership dead.

And if the regime remains in control after the war, Iran will continue to be a formidable regional power.

As a large nation, with a sizeable army and petroleum-based economy, Iran has always been seen as powerful. It has stood alone in the region, having mostly hostile and adversarial relationships with its neighbours. It projected its power in other countries through proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shia militant groups in Iraq, and Hamas in Gaza.

However, Iran's ability to inflict considerable harm on its enemies, with far-reaching consequences for the world, has been largely an abstraction.

Until now.

Iran’s continental defence strategy has been effective enough in the war. With a decimated navy and air force, it has still been able to sustain strikes against targets in Israel and Persian Gulf states with a US military presence.

This is largely thanks to the decentralised command and control structure of the Iranian Defence Forces and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Known as a "mosaic defence" strategy, the IRGC's regional command centres have been given semi-autonomous control over strikes against Israel and the Gulf states. They can also call on local Basij volunteers (under the command of the IRGC) to bolster their ranks.

This strategy was explicitly described by Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi, who said on the first day of the war:

Our military units are now, in fact, independent and somewhat isolated, and they are acting based on general instructions given to them in advance.

The regime's ability to unilaterally cause a global energy crisis will also be remembered long after the war. Closing the Strait of Hormuz has made the war everybody’s problem, imposing political and economic costs so great it has left the largest military in the world looking for an off ramp.

And Iran has reportedly sent transmissions intercepted by the Pentagon believed to be an "operational trigger" to activate sleeper cells around the world.

These are core pillars in a strategy of asymmetric warfare. While Iran cannot match the firepower of Israeli and US forces, it can leverage the power it does have quite effectively and use its enemies' size and power against them.

Unwittingly, the US and Israel have only strengthened Iran's deterrence against future direct attacks.

While it will take some time for Iran to rebuild its full capacity, it will likely double down on the elements that have been most effective: ballistic missiles, drone capacity and securing the strait. Russia (and possibly China) may assist – Moscow has already been helping Iran target US assets in the region via satellite.

Then there is the nuclear question. Iran has not meaningfully rebuilt its nuclear facilities since the joint US-Israeli strikes last year. But if it can do so, it likely will. A nuclear weapon is the ultimate deterrence against future attacks, and that is an attractive proposition for the Islamic Republic right now.

View Andrew's profile

Jessica Genauer

Associate Professor in International Relations at the University of New South Wales

Israel's diplomatic and security integration with the region has been shattered.

The war in Iran has broken US President Donald Trump's approach to reshaping Middle East geopolitics.

Since Trump's first term in office, he has focused on driving Israeli integration into the region. In 2020, the US-led Abraham Accords established diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan for the first time since the creation of the state of Israel.

The Abraham Accords aimed to redraw geopolitical alliances across the region by accelerating Israeli economic and security interdependence. At the same time, they bypassed the thorny political issue of the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Following the accords, Israel established a free-trade agreement with the UAE, the first ever of its kind between Israel and an Arab nation. The agreement came into force in 2023.

Since then, trade between Israel and the UAE has continued to grow, despite Israel's two-year military operation in Gaza that has left more than 70,000 Palestinians dead. The UAE is currently Israel's largest trading partner across the Arab world.

In 2021, the UAE, Bahrain and Israel also conducted joint naval exercises for the first time. These economic and security ties were fragile, but were getting stronger.

The war in Iran has shattered this model of Israeli regional integration.

The rationale for the Gulf states of deterring Iranian direct aggression through increased security ties with Israel has proven futile in the face of recent Iranian attacks.

In addition, the war has activated domestic resistance in these countries to increased closeness with Israel. The citizenry in Gulf countries are increasingly concerned that the US prioritises Israel's interests over their own.

View Jessica's profile

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute, Rice University

The Gulf states may look to powers other than the US to maintain regional security.

From the perspective of Persian Gulf states, the war has dispelled a number of assumptions about both Iran and the United States.

The Gulf states have now seen what the regime in Tehran can, and will, do when it believes itself to be under existential threat. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates know for sure what living with a hostile Iran entails – and it puts them in the position of sitting ducks.

As a result, the Gulf states will have to pivot their security arrangements accordingly, with the knowledge that Iran is prepared to hit back at any US aggression by targeting Washington's allies in the region.

The war has upended the post-1990 security arrangement in the Gulf, which was predicated on the US being a stable, reliable, predicable actor contributing to regional stability.

Instead, the US is now viewed in the Gulf as contributing to instability and undermining efforts to de-risk the region. And that reframing of the US role will require a great deal of rethinking across Gulf capitals.

The reality they face is no real option for an alternative security arrangement in the short term. But the war might change their notion of security in the longer term, and encourage a process that has been under way for a decade or so: the diversification of the Gulf's security and diplomatic network.

What has become clear is that by waging war in Iran, Washington views its relationship with Israel as far more important than its security arrangements with Gulf states.

And that affects how the Saudis have linked the idea of normalising ties with Israel with regional security.

Going forward, what we may see is continued tacit cooperation between Israel, the Gulf and the US – after all, Iran is still a shared threat – but without the diplomatic efforts towards normalisation. The Saudis, and others, may also look to powers other than the US to underwrite any agreement in the region.

Iran has now been attacked twice while in negotiations – first in June 2025 and again now. As a result, the credibility of the US as a good-faith negotiator is shot. That leaves a credibility gap that could leave a greater role for China, which served as a mediator in 2023 when Saudi Arabia and Iran normalised relations, or other powers such as India or Pakistan.

None can provide assistance to the Gulf in terms of hard security. But the Saudis, for example, will be looking at Beijing to leverage its ties with Tehran and ensure it can keep the Iranians honest about any post-war agreements with Gulf states.

The war is also likely to entrench a determination among Gulf states to diversify their economies. The ease at which the Strait of Hormuz was closed to most shipping and the vulnerability of the oil sector has underscored this.

View Kristian's profile

Chris Ogden

Associate Professor in Global Studies, University of Auckland

Iran will likely deepen its control over the Strait of Hormuz.

Provided the ruling Iranian elite stays in power and doesn't lose control of the vital Kharg Island oil terminal, energy security will be the issue that most defines Iran’s significance after this conflict.

By retaining dominance over the Strait of Hormuz, Iran would still be the key regional gatekeeper to about 20% of the world's oil and gas supply. With this pivotal geostrategic position, the country will be essential to the safe passage of its own oil and gas shipments, and those from across the Persian Gulf.

To reinforce this, it's likely Tehran will charge shipping transit fees, which it started doing during the war. This would further bind other countries to it, augment Iran’s economic recovery and amplify its regional diplomatic influence.

If that happens, we will see a distinct dichotomy between those countries that supported Tehran – either implicitly or explicitly – and those that didn't.

The latter camp will include the United States, of course, and any other Western power drawn into the conflict. At worst, these countries will be refused access to the region’s oil and gas. At best, they could be charged a high premium for the privilege.

This would also likely affect the Gulf states, especially if their security relationships with the US persist and American bases remain in their territories.

In the face of lost revenues, affected Gulf states may abandon their US ties entirely in favour of ensuring energy exports to Asia. This would diminish Washington’s regional influence, signalling a rebalancing of regional power.

Major countries that did not oppose Iran may be the biggest beneficiaries. While they may seek to diversify their energy sources away from Iran, as well as accelerate the expansion of more sustainable energy sources, China and India would lead this group.

Beijing has given Tehran military cooperation, while New Delhi has provided humanitarian aid. Their strategic partnerships with Iran – well established before the conflict – would only deepen, boosting mutual economic development. Russia, which has helped Iran logistically during the conflict, would likely also benefit.

Such developments would further confirm the deconstruction of the Western liberal international order and its replacement by a multipolar system with Asian powers in the ascendancy.

One negative outcome for China, India and Russia may be the weaker diplomatic coherence of the BRICS+ group of nations. Iran has targeted US assets in the United Arab Emirates. Both countries are BRICS+ members. Saudi Arabia, also targeted by Iran, has been close to joining the group.

Any lasting animosity between members might also delay the launch of a shared BRICS+ currency, itself a project designed to counter American power and influence.

View Chris's profile